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Agricultural reform in Ukraine
Agriculture accounts for a significant share
of Ukraine's GDP; it also plays an important
social function, since the rural population
almost entirely depends on it. However, despite
its huge potential, the sector continues to suffer
from inefficiency and nonNcompetitiveness.
These two factors point directly to the urgent
need for reform in Ukraine's agriculture. 
Reforms in the sector have been sluggish,
and major problems still remain unresolved.
While the problems are numerous and their
nature  is not unique to Ukraine, some of them
need to be addressed first in order to ensure
the success of the whole reform process.
Crucial areas where urgent improvement
is needed include state policy development
and implementation, farm restructuring
and land reform, and rural financing.
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Introduction 
FRANK BOSTYN AND ANDRIY BOYTSUN 
In Ukraine, agriculture represents almost 
% of GDP and even a greater share of 
country’s total employment. It has an im1
portant social function, since the rural 
population (which makes up approximately 
% of Ukraine’s total population) almost 
entirely depends on it. Furthermore, the 
performance of Ukraine’s overall economy 
is largely dependent on the fortunes in the 
agricultural sector; and the GDP fall in re1
cent years has been largely due to the de1
cline in this sector. The contribution of 
agriculture to export revenues is in line 
with its part in the GDP, although it still 
remains weak compared to its potential. 
It is generally observed that the agricultural 
sector in Ukraine has a lot of potential. 
Agro1climatic conditions are particularly 
favourable for grains, oilseeds, root and 
fibre crops, as well as for livestock and tem1
perate fruits and vegetables. Ukraine has 
had relative cost advantages in crops such 
as wheat and sunflower, and could eventu1
ally achieve them for beef and pork produc1
tion, as well. It is easier to analyse The po1
tential of Ukraine’s agricultural sector 
could be summarised by way of the follow1
ing strengths1weaknesses analysis: 
Table .  Strengths and weaknesses of Ukraine’s agriculture 
Strengths Weaknesses 
General 
. Abundant agricultural resources. 
. Rich soils: % of the world’s black soils 
(chernozems), comprising % of the 
country’s ploughed land. 
. Favourable growing conditions for – 
days of the year. 
. Variety of climatic conditions. 
. Geopolitical location: 
• Located between East and West; 
• Year1round access to the Black Sea. 
. Insufficient humidity of / of the rich 
soils in the central and southern parts of 
the territory (less than  mm/year), and 
excessive humidity in the north and west 
of the country. 
. Low productivity: crops are –% less 
productive than in Western Europe, milk 
is productivity  times lower, and meat is 
productivity –% lower in cattle and –
 times lower in hogs. 
. Lack of a proper input base (chemicals, 
transport, machinery, etc.) for small and 
medium1sized producers. 
. Lack of experience and knowledge of most 
private producers regarding exports and 
any other commercial activities. 
Labour 
. Good traditions in agriculture (source of 
wheat, milk, sugar, oil, and milk for the 
Soviet Union, and the Russian Empire be1
fore that). 
. Lack of knowledge, tradition, experience, 
and education for profitable private farm1
ing; an acute need for management and 
marketing training. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
. Large rural population used to agricul1
tural production. Substantial part (–
%) of urban population is willing to be 
involved in agriculture. 
. Large number of individual producers 
(subsidiary holdings). 
. Absence of an organisational background 
for adequate professional and interprofes1
sional non1governmental farming associa1
tions at national and regional levels. 
. Lack of appropriate living conditions ham1
pering the return and settlement of the ur1
ban population in rural areas. Insufficient 
cultural, educational, or medical infrastruc1
ture. 
Market 
. Historical background: good opportuni1
ties and long1term relations with Russia 
and other former Soviet Union countries. 
. Opportunities in the Far and Middle East 
markets. 
. Relatively low cost of agricultural com1
modities, first of all vegetable oils and 
grains. 
. Low farmgate prices for meat and milk. 
. Excessive processing margin. 
. Presently severed links with the former So1
viet Union partners at the official level, 
shrinkage of exports to Russia. 
. Absence of a trading infrastructure, espe1
cially for exports. 
. Quality grading inconsistent with interna1
tional standards, which hampers foreign 
market entry. 
. No price policy. 
Infrastructure, institutions and management 
. Gradual transition from command and 
control economics to more effective, self1
organised free market management. 
. Conversion to new ownership relations is 
underway. Land reform and farm restruc1
turing speeded up in  and  by the 
re1elected President and the new reformist 
government. 
. Lack of an appropriate infrastructure for 
inputs (chemicals, agricultural and trans1
port machinery, etc.) for small and medium1
sized agricultural producers. 
. Poor contract enforcement, due to the in1
experienced and susceptible judiciary and 
faulty execution system. 
. Management often oriented towards out1
put, not demand and costs. Lack of long1
term strategies. 
Source: Adapted from F. Bostyn and C. MorandFehr, : – and F. Bostyn, : –.
Despite the strengths of Ukrainian agricul1
ture, its output has been falling in the past 
decade. In , Ukraine’s agriculture 
shrank to less than a half of its  size. 
The decline has been due to both overall 
economic factors and to the lack of any new 
industry1specific policy, which has made 
agriculture the least reformed sector in 
Ukraine’s economy.  
Improvement in the rural economy is very 
much contingent on the success of agricul1
tural reform, which must eventually lead to 
an effective agricultural sector. It is ex1
tremely important to secure the sustainable 
profitability of this sector, given its share in 
Ukraine’s GDP. 
It has always been popular to argue that 
Ukraine, like many leading Western coun1
tries, should provide massive government 
 POLICY STUDIES #, JANUARY  

support and subsidies to agriculture. It is 
obvious, though, that an economy can pro1
vide such support only at the expense of its 
other—profitable—sectors. Therefore, this is 
possible when the share of the unprofitable 
sector in GDP is relatively small (like in the 
said Western countries), but the industry 
itself is very important for the economy. 
However, when an industry accounts for 
one1fifth of GDP, the objective should be to 
make it self1subsistent (i.e., not dependent 
on all kinds of government subsidies) and 
profitable. 
In October , the newly elected Presi1
dent, Leonid Kuchma, announced the 
main directions of agricultural reform pol1
icy, aimed at a faster transition to a free 
market in the agricultural sector. The be1
ginning of the reform was quite successful, 
especially in terms of land reform. How1
ever, the reform stalled at a later stage; this 
was basically caused by two groups of fac1
tors—political and “technical”. Since the 
political factors are discussed in the articles 
herein, below we shall briefly examine the 
“technical” factors that have stood in the 
way. 
As a legacy of the former Soviet1era organ1
isational structures, in Ukraine there has 
been a lack of co1ordination and strategic 
integration of policy measures, largely due 
to the existence of parallel monolithic 
structures, and also inherent over1
specialisation. Hence, policy formulation 
has been rather weak, and decision1making 
agencies are still not well1equipped in terms 
of working methods, procedures, and ex1
pertise adapted to the new political and 
economic environment. The result is often 
a lack of coherence, sub1optimal use of pol1
icy instruments and resources, a lack of co1
ordination, unclear responsibilities, and 
belated policy responses. 
Accurate perception of the real problems in 
the Ukrainian agricultural sector has been 
dubious. The lack of experience with a 
market economy, and the legacy of the old 
system and way of thinking, still very much 
influence the way policymakers identify 
problems. Hence, already the starting point 
of the policy debate has often been wrong 
or poorly defined. Analysis of problems has 
tended to be even poorer. No significant 
tradition of policy analysis and strategic 
thinking, adequate for a market economy, 
yet exists. Since the executive branch of 
government was still poorly adapted to the 
new political and economic conditions 
(e.g., sectoral ministries were organised as 
instruments of an administered economy), 
analysis has been too often conducted in 
terms of administering the economy. In the 
case of the governmental agencies respon1
sible for agriculture (the sectoral ministry 
and state committees), this was perhaps the 
most obvious. Hence, no wonder effective 
policy formulation procedures are still 
missing in Ukrainian agriculture, for the 
whole fabric of policymaking as a funda1
mental function of the executive is still 
emerging. 
Finally, agricultural reform in Ukraine re1
ceived a new impetus at the end of , 
soon after the presidential elections, when 
on  December President Kuchma signed 
Decree No. / “On immediate meas1
ures to accelerate reform of the agricultural 
sector of the economy”. It was mostly fo1
cused on fostering farm restructuring by (i) 
reconfirming the right of CAE shareholders 
to withdraw their shares (land and prop1
erty) from CAEs and prohibiting the re1
striction of this right by decision of meet1
ings of CAE shareholders; (ii) allowing 
groups of owners to receive/lease adjoin1
ing land parcels to be used jointly; (iii) 
simplifying the procedure for expanding 
subsidiary farms/plots; and (iv) recognis1
                                                                    
 Implementation of this regulation, however, is 
questionable, since the effective law does not 
describe how such groups of owners can obtain 
joint ownership of their land parcels, which is a 
necessary condition for entering into a lease 
agreement. 
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ing land share certificates as legal docu1
ments entitling their bearers to possess, 
use, and dispose of such shares. However, 
there is still some work to be done in this 
area, since important issues such as farms’ 
debts, which prevent farms from restructur1
ing, have remained unsettled. 
The government has also shown its inten1
tion to refrain from participating in agricul1
tural production by adopting a series of 
measures which tackle the issues of input 
supplies and rural credit. 
Despite these positive changes, land re1
form, farm restructuring, and rural finance 
remain among the most important generic 
problems that need to be addressed to 
achieve progress in Ukrainian agriculture. 
LAND REFORM—aimed at unrestricted pri1
vate ownership and tradability of land—is 
crucial, since the overall objective of agri1
cultural reform is to ensure the better per1
formance of agriculture, i.e., to improve 
the efficiency of farms and of the sector as a 
whole. In these terms, the institution of 
private ownership of land is an indispensa1
ble condition to achieve this objective.  
There are three major functions that pri1
vate ownership generally fulfills in a market 
economy. First, it ensures that there are 
real owners of assets/resources (not only 
land, but also means of production)—unlike 
the case of collective or state ownership, 
where the resources are taken for granted. 
Thus, private ownership ensures the pro1
ductive use of resources, which is an under1
lying condition for effective management. 
Second, it allows owners to use their assets 
as collateral. The fact of having collateral 
allows involving outside creditors in the 
production process, via their loans secured 
by that collateral. Third, the threat of losing 
their assets makes owners/managers re1
frain from risky decisions, and they manage 
their enterprises with the purpose of mak1
ing (and maximising) profit. This, again, 
ensures the productive use of resources and 
efficient management; and if the manage1
ment is not efficient, the enterprises will be 
taken over by new, efficient owners. 
FARM RESTRUCTURING—aimed at improve1
ment of farm performance (i.e., improved 
profitability and efficiency)—is thus de1
pendent on the success of land reform, be1
cause it needs a new institutional basis to 
rest on. The results of farm restructuring in 
Ukraine have been limited, particularly due 
to the unresolved land issue. Restructuring 
of agricultural enterprises itself is crucial, 
since the new economic environment re1
quires a significant adjustment of enter1
prises thereto (operation, management 
methods, marketing, and related areas)—a 
task they can hardly undertake on their 
own, especially after agriculture was so 
heavily regulated in the Soviet era. 
The third unresolved issue, RURAL FINANC)
ING, prevents farms from operating in a 
proper manner. Farms in Ukraine lack 
working capital, and have no feasible assets 
to pledge; neither do they have a reputa1
tion that would help them obtain credits 
from lenders. Hence, agriculture has been 
unable to attract long1term financing or 
investment. The lack of creditworthiness of 
farms remains the major problem of farm 
financing. Stuck in these problems, farmers 
often are forced to forego potentially prof1
itable investment projects, and most agri1
cultural enterprises are constantly on the 
verge of bankruptcy, even though the state 
has forgiven their debts to the government 
many times over.  
These problems prevent potentially profit1
able agricultural production and related 
agricultural development. As becomes clear 
from the above discussion, these issues 
                                                                    
 Land could be one of those assets, though. 
 However, a moratorium on bankruptcy of agri1
cultural enterprises was introduced. Such a pol1
icy action hampers the development of efficient 
ownership relations, and thus undermines the 
very economic foundation of agriculture. 
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must be the first to be addressed on 
Ukraine’s agricultural policy agenda, since 
the rest of the reform is contingent on 
them. Unless they are addressed properly, 
little or no improvement can be achieved in 
agriculture overall. And unless they are ad1
dressed quickly, it may be very difficult to 
repair the consequences in the long run. 
The major problems of Ukrainian agricul1
ture are discussed in the first part of this 
issue of Policy Studies, while the second part 
concentrates on two sub1sectors in agri1
business—oilseeds and sugar.  
Everyone familiar with Ukrainian agricul1
ture will agree that both sectors are sensi1
tive, but for different reasons. Oilseeds 
might have high potential, while the sugar 
sector is in deep trouble, with little hope 
for sustainable improvements. 
The Ukrainian oilseed industry has been 
relatively successful and managed to attract 
significant foreign investment. This sug1
gests that the sector is internationally com1
petitive and that policy distortions that have 
discouraged investment in other areas of 
agriculture, such as grain production and 
processing, have had a less damaging effect 
on oilseeds.  
However current, government policy is 
badly hampering the strengthening of the 
sector, which would allow Ukraine to tap on 
excellent export potentials. In particular, 
policymakers in Ukraine introduced an 
export duty on oilseeds. Such intervention 
is capable of eliminating any incentive for 
increased efficiency, and hence, the dy1
namic effects of this policy measure will be 
quite harmful for the international com1
petitiveness of the oilseed industry. 
The picture for sugar production is com1
pletely different: the Ukrainian sugar in1
dustry cannot withstand competition on the 
world market and, hence, the whole sector 
needs reworking.  
From an economic point of view, the 
straightforward answer would be to fold the 
sector. The challenge remains huge, how1
ever, at the social and political level; the 
immediate social fall1out in terms of layoffs 
looms large. Hence, seemingly sound eco1
nomic policies are confronted with the in1
surmountable challenge of making them 
politically acceptable. Pressure from within 
is high to keep sectors going artificially with 
heavy state intervention and subsidisation, 
but that kind of solution is not sustainable 
in the long term. Hence, there is a need for 
a more structural approach, focusing on 
long1term sustainability.  
 POLICY STUDIES #, JANUARY  
Agricultural strategy outline 
FRANK BOSTYN 
The slow pace of reforms in Ukrainian agriculture is mainly caused by the 
government’s inability to develop and implement a sound reform strategy, aimed 
at ensuring longterm sustainability of the sector. The inability results from a 
number of factors, including inadequate capability to analyse policy 
requirements; lack of coordinated policy formulation and implementation; 
inadequate administrative structures; lack of clarity on effective leadership; the 
influence of those having a stake in halfway reforms; and the influence of 
conservative forces. When these crucial problems are resolved, the government 
will be ready to develop an agricultural reform strategy aimed at providing a 
proper macroeconomic and legal environment, effective markets, and further 
enterprise restructuring. 
Main obstacles for reform in the agroindustrial 
complex 
Success of agricultural reform is mainly 
determined by government ability to de1
velop and implement a sound reform strat1
egy. Still, many problems remain in this 
area, among which the most important are: 
. inadequate capability to analyse policy 
requirements; 
. lack of co1ordinated policy formulation 
and implementation;  
. inadequate administrative structures; 
. lack of clarity about effective leader1
ship; 
. the influence of those having a stake in 
halfway reforms; and 
. the influence of conservative forces. 
Inadequate capability to analyse 
policy requirements 
Perception of the real problems is ques1
tionable. The lack of experience with a 
market economy, and the legacy of the old 
system and way of thinking, still very much 
influence the way policymakers and opin1
ion leaders identify problems. Hence, al1
ready the starting point of the policy debate 
has often been wrong or poorly defined. 
Analysis of the policy problems tends to be 
even poorer. The old paradigm of eco1
nomic analysis still prevails, disregarding 
the complex functioning of a market econ1
omy. Analysis is too often made in terms of 
administering the economy (e.g., an1
nouncement of production objectives by 
the Ministry of Agriculture that are, in fact, 
planning instructions rather than esti1
mates/expectations). No significant tradi1
tion of policy analysis and strategic thinking 
really exists. 
Lack of coordinated policy 
formulation and implementation 
The whole fabric of policymaking as a fun1
damental function of the government is still 
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emerging in newly independent Ukraine. 
The learning process is, however, not sys1
tematic and not strategically thought out. 
This might, unfortunately, lead to missed 
opportunities. 
A major factor influencing the situation is 
the fundamental lack of policy co1
ordination, due to an unclear definition of 
powers and responsibilities among the mul1
titude of governmental bodies in the sector. 
The  Constitution of Ukraine took 
away some of the confusion over important 
issues like the legislative framework, legisla1
tive initiative, policy formulation, and ex1
ecutive control. However, the concrete op1
eration of governmental bodies under the 
terms of the new constitution is still in its 
formative phase. Moreover, the administra1
tive structure of the executive is still poorly 
adapted to the new political and economic 
conditions. 
This often results in a proliferation of ad hoc 
policy measures, not integrated in a global 
approach and more often remaining purely 
on paper. This is a consequence of a rather 
formalistic and very bureaucratic policy 
formulation process, typically driven by post
hoc responses, i.e., problems are identified 
after analysis of the results of the previous 
period. Typically, the main reason for iden1
tifying problems and putting them on the 
agenda has been to sanction those pre1
sumed responsible.  
The accumulation of paper resolutions as a 
response to conditionalities put forward by 
international financial institutions and do1
nors, remaining without real implementa1
tion, has been trying the patience of these 
bodies, with the Ukrainian government 
increasing their frustration. Out of this has 
grown the preference of some donors to 
use their TA projects directly to put pres1
sure on the government, and also to foster 
their own political and commercial inter1
ests. These are very unfortunate responses, 
being quite counter1productive in terms of 




The administrative structure of the Ukrain1
ian executive is still poorly adapted to the 
new political and economic conditions. The 
Ministry of Agricultural Policy is still wholly 
organised as the tool of an administrated 
economy, and lacks the essential functions 
of such a ministry within the context of a 
market economy. The double structure 
with the Cabinet of Ministers and sectoral 
ministries complicates policy formulation 
and implementation. This is mainly a legacy 
of the Soviet past, typified by parallel mono1
lithic structures and inherent over1
specialisation. 
We can observe growing frustration, at a 
high level, with the functioning and the 
results of the administrative structures of 
government. This can and does, in some 
cases, induce an increasing awareness of 
the need to fundamentally reorganise these 
structures and a greater openness to exter1
nal advice on related matters. However, 
ministers and the government as a whole 
often remain relatively powerless, even if 
their reform intentions and enthusiasm 
might be pronounced. The stake of the un1
reformed administration in a status quo 
might even lead to opposition to the gov1
ernment and a de facto split in the execu1
tive branch of power, as is illustrated in the 
refusal to implement policy decisions, or 
sabotage of their implementation. 
The monolithic structures in Ukraine, cor1
responding to vast economic sectors, lead 
to a close marriage between these struc1
tures and specific economic/political in1
terests, inducing a very strong tendency 
towards corporatism and narrow1minded 
sectoral protectionism. This trend is clearly 
visible in the AIC, and blocks effective re1
form and structural reform, so badly 
needed to really develop the agricultural 
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potential of the country to the benefit of all 
of the population. Illustrations of this are 
countless: the absence of effective farm re1
structuring, the blockage of sound or radi1
cal land reform, the disastrous special pri1
vatisation law for the agro1processing sec1
tor, claims for protectionism, etc. 
Lack of clarity about effective 
leadership 
In periods of dramatic change affecting the 
economic system, the political system, and 
the establishment of a newly independent 
state, institutional arrangements are often 
blurred, and within such a context social 
and political tensions and indecisiveness 
might arise. Effective leadership, socially 
legitimated, can orient the transition pe1
riod in a more effective direction. However, 
Ukraine still appears to be a victim of un1
productive political disputes and antago1
nism. 
At the operational level of governance, this 
is often exacerbated by the following short1
comings: (a) lack of authority or delegation 
of responsibility; (b) weakness in introduc1
ing a global vision; and (c) poor communi1
cation skills, or even neglect of communica1
tion. The three are, of course, interlinked. 
In such a context, it is not surprising that 
efforts to overcome the weaknesses of the 
administration are very scattered and only 
pursued in a very hesitant way. The alterna1
tives themselves are influenced by the old 
traditions, which entails further constraints. 
Typically, a minister would rely on outside 
advice from academic institutions. Tradi1
tionally, policy formulation has been heav1
ily influenced by the scientific or academic 
community, but the slow pace of self1
renovation of these bodies led to the persis1
tence of outdated ways of problem formula1
tion and analysis. Furthermore, the ad hoc 
consultation and involvement of these pro1
fessionals as a complementary activity to 
their main job, does not lead to serious at1
tempts for strategic integration, but em1
phasises the traditional tendency towards a 
partial approach and compartmentalisa1
tion. 
Moreover, the new political system has not 
yet matured, and political fault lines tend to 
get institutionalised, especially in an an1
tagonism between the legislative and the 
executive branches of power. As a result, 
the normal functioning of a parliamentary 
democracy is still very doubtful; or at least, 
in such circumstances, this political system 
delivers poor policymaking and consensus1
building results. 
The influence of those having a 
stake in halfway reforms 
Within the current institutional and eco1
nomic context, entrepreneurship is, not 
surprisingly, weak. Incentives are lacking, 
risks are extremely high, and needed re1
sources are difficult to gather or attract. 
Persistent administrative interventions 
hamper initiatives and often discourage 
sincere entrepreneurship. Consequently, 
corruption, illegal profit1taking, and collu1
sion between business and administration 
gain field and give way to the emergence of 
groups having an interest in maintaining 
half1way economic reforms. 
The influence of conservative 
forces 
In Ukraine, supporters of the orthodox 
Communist concepts (e.g., collective land 
ownership) still influence public opinion. 
Some of them believe sincerely in the effi1
ciency of state administration of the econ1
omy, while the majority seeks economic 
advantages from maintaining current struc1
tures. Even today, this latter group is striv1
ing, at the legislative and administrative 
level, to establish preferences and privi1
leges which allow them to secure control 
over enterprises and avoid market competi1
tion. Not less important for them is to take 
a lion’s share of real assets during a privati1
sation deal. Large portions of the rural 
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population—some for fear of losing their 
job and the social benefits still delivered by 
kolkhozes, some for lack of information, and 
some for their inability to independently 
adjust to a new environment—ignorantly 
support the conservatives. 
Results for the Ukrainian agricultural sector 
Partially as a result of these problems at the 
stage of developing a reform strategy, the 
Ukrainian agricultural sector and agro1
industry are still in deep crisis. Agricultural 
output keeps on declining, and the process1
ing sector is near total collapse. The social 
and economic importance of the so1called 
agro1industrial complex for Ukraine entails 
that these economic problems risk trigger1
ing a profound social crisis in rural areas. 
The potentials of agriculture and the rural 
sector in general might be very important; 
however, the right economic and institu1
tional conditions are not really in place to 
let them fully develop. Ill1conceived agricul1
tural policies account for a large part of the 
decline in Ukrainian agricultural output. 
The right incentives for management and 
the workforce are not in place; hence, low 
levels of factor productivity. Monopolistic 
and inefficient distribution systems for ag1
ricultural inputs and outputs, resulting 
from the planned economy, are still playing 
an decisive role. Implicit influence and 
control over prices through contracts and 
state orders has continued. This has all re1
sulted in pressure on farms to sell at low 
prices as a condition for access to a supply 
of otherwise hard1to1get inputs and credits. 
Hence, international prices are poorly 
transmitted to the domestic market, and 
the agricultural terms of trade have under1
gone substantial erosion. 
Poorly conceived privatisation schemes 
have not solved corporate governance 
problems; nor have they triggered real en1
terprise restructuring and structural ad1
justment. Efficiency remains low in agricul1
ture and agro1processing, as well as in input 
and output markets. Renewal of the techni1
cal and managerial base, with inflow of in1
vestment capital, is almost nonexistent. 
Farming is hampered in its development 
and restructuring by the lack of secure and 
transferable land use rights, land mobility, 
documented property rights, sound legal 
frameworks for land lease, land markets 
and land as collateral, access to financial 
markets, legal framework for organisational 
forms of entrepreneurship, and—last but 
not least—a fundamental lack of informa1
tion on the rights and responsibilities of the 
rural population.  
Results for the national economy 
The lack of effective structural adjustment 
in the AIC and in other sectors of the econ1
omy of Ukraine has already started to erode 
the previously accomplished currency re1
form and monetary stabilisation. Macro1
economic stabilisation can be sustainable if 
it is underpinned by a sound (microeco1
nomic) structure; but this is not the case in 
Ukraine. Macroeconomic stabilisation—in 
fact, only monetary stability—has been 
stretched by purely monetary policy meas1
ures and international financial support, 
but is now at the verge of collapse. Radical 
and effective structural adjustment is im1
perative and urgently needed, in order not 
to put relative monetary stability at risk. 
The chances of further economic collapse 
are still real, and the main explanation will 
be the de facto lack of economic reforms 
and structural adjustment. This would 
catapult Ukraine in an even deeper eco1
nomic and social crisis. It would then take 
many years to reverse the situation, entail1
ing real losses of wealth and real suffering 
for the population.  
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Preconditions for an effective reform strategy 
From the above, it can be learnt that there 
are some preconditions for an effective re1
form strategy. Economic and agricultural 
reform is about policy, not merely about 
economics. Ideally, economic insights 
should drive strategy development and the 
reform process, but politics is about making 
it possible. Politics is the art of the possible. 
This should, however, not be interpreted in 
a fatalistic way, but should rather be per1
ceived in a pro1active way, allowing strategic 
and tactical moves with the aim of reaching 
the final objectives. 
It is clear that in order to succeed with re1
forms, the AIC administrative structure 
should be tackled right away and in a radi1
cal way. However, the functional reorienta1
tion of the ministry should not be seen as 
an isolated act, but should be incorporated 
in a global strategy for developing effective 
governance structures in Ukraine, adapted 
to a market economy, that would be in1
strumental and not obstructive to the policy 
set by democratically elected bodies. The 
basic principle should be that there are suf1
ficient checks and balances in the new gov1
ernance structure to avoid the problem of 
moral hazard in the administration and the 
development of disproportional power cen1
tres out of democratic control, as we have 
now with some corporatist and monolithic 
structures. 
The best way to look at the issue is through 
the principal–agent perspective. The ad1
ministration has to act on behalf of the gov1
ernment. However, the government is de1
mocratically accountable and changes regu1
larly, while the administration stays in 
place. The ministry is also supposed to col1
lect the information on which the govern1
ment sets its policy. This might lead to a 
situation where the administration sets its 
own agenda or wants to hide its poor per1
formance by willingly misinforming the 
government. Such a tendency is more 
probable, and also quite dangerous, when 
the administration comes under the influ1
ence (or even slight pressure) of economic 
interest groups. The temptation for collu1
sion can be very important, as the rents can 
be huge. Such a situation is called corrup1
tion. 
It is important that the government have 
enough control over the administration. 
Even better is to have proper structures, 
which prevent the emergence and devel1
opment of principal–agent problems. In 
any case, sectoral collusion should be abso1
lutely tackled and prevented; otherwise the 
government can no longer be in charge. 
This condition is, however, not fully ful1
filled in Ukraine. The dominance of the 
monolithic organisation of political gov1
ernance structures is the single most impor1
tant cause for this problem. Therefore, it is 
absolutely imperative to break these struc1
tures right away. 
Furthermore, the reform of the administra1
tive structure is not only a matter of tack1
ling the principal–agent problem, but of 
sound governance and division of political 
responsibilities. Here, the major principles 
should be the following: 
• The agricultural sector should not be 
treated differently from any other eco1
nomic sector. Should one do this any1
way, then it would be at the expense of 
other sectors, and, hence, finally at the 
expense of the well1being of the popula1
tion. 
• As far as there are specific concerns for 
agriculture as a primary sector, this can 
only be the case for the activities directly 
linked to nature (land, weather/climate 
conditions), i.e., farming versus process1
ing. 
• Following the first two principles, a re1
organised ministry of agriculture should 
only be responsible for the farming sec1
tor and the market for primary agricul1
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tural products; the responsibility for the 
agro1processing and food industries 
should be transferred to the ministry of 
economy. 
• The educational system of the AIC (uni1
versities, colleges, secondary schools) 
should be transferred to the ministry of 
education. Food control, health regula1
tions regarding agricultural products, 
etc., should become the prerogative of 
the ministry of health care. 
• Land title registration and land use 
regulation are not agricultural policy 
matters: they are of a broader nature, 
regarding the physical, infrastructural, 
and legal (property rights) organisation 
of the country. Consequently, title regis1
tration is a legal matter regarding the 
securing of property rights and should, 
hence, be subordinated to the ministry 
of justice or a separate body, integrating 
title registration of all real estate (uni1
fied cadastre). Hence, the State Com1
mittee for Land Resources can be abol1
ished. 
• There is no need to have a complemen1
tary Department for Agriculture at the 
Cabinet of Ministers level. 
Finally, the remaining preconditions for 
developing a viable reform strategy include 
effective leadership and neutralisation of 
the influence of those having a stake in 
halfway reforms and of the conservative 
forces. These are purely political factors. 
Building blocks for an agricultural strategy 
Once the obstacles discussed above are 
adequately dealt with and the precondi1
tions are met, a sound reform strategy can 
be successfully implemented. This strategy, 
as a conceptual plan with a broad and de1
tailed action scheme, should emerge from 
the Ukrainian policy formulation process 
itself, and should not be “imported” by 
granting one or another blueprint by out1
side advisers the status of an official plan by 
decree. That way, it will simply not work. 
Elements of the reform strategy should be 
carefully elaborated, taking into account 
their costs, effectiveness and implement1
ability, the risks of effective obstruction and 
misuse of policy measures for group inter1
ests, proper timing, co1ordination and con1
sistency of the measures, etc. In other 
words, the process should be driven by real1
ism and pragmatism. 
To be successful, the plan must be broadly 
accepted by and committed to by the ad1
ministrative/governance structures which 
have to implement it. This means that it is 
imperative to engage these structures al1
ready at the formative stage. To bring this 
about can be one of the major tasks of the 
Secretariat of the Presidential Commission 
for Agricultural Policy. The Secretariat has 
the mandate to introduce and activate poli1
cymaking mechanisms for proper prepara1
tion of policy proposals, estimating the 
costs of alternative proposals, ensuring 
their critical evaluation through consulta1
tion and debate, and reaching and re1
cording decisions and monitoring their 
implementation. This entails the develop1
ment of an effective capacity to facilitate 
consultation, and to co1ordinate proposals 
among ministries before they are submitted 
for final approval. 
Taking into account the very nature of sec1
toral reform strategy in a transition econ1
omy, the basic philosophy of it should be as 
follows: the overall objective is to increase 
the wealth of the nation and its population 
in a sustainable way. Therefore, it is neces1
sary to improve the economic efficiency of 
the sector. The right way to do this in a 
market economy is to create the proper 
general environment that can induce in1
creased efficiency at the microeconomic 
(enterprise) level. Hence, the government 
should aim at ensuring: 
 POLICY STUDIES #, JANUARY  
• a proper macroeconomic and legal en1
vironment; 
• effective markets; and 
• further enterprise restructuring. 
While the first objective (i.e., developing a 
proper macroeconomic and legal environ1
ment) refers to the whole economic system 
and, hence, is beyond the scope of our 
analysis, we will briefly discuss the remain1
ing sector1specific objectives. Although the 
logical framework of a reform strategy pre1
sented below is not intended to be com1
plete, it might be helpful to structure dis1
cussions and a workplan to come to a de1
tailed strategy. 
Developing effective markets 
The role of effective markets is paramount 
to reach an optimal situation of economic 
efficiency, and hence of sustainable devel1
opment and welfare. The functioning of 
the market should stimulate sustainable 
economic activities, otherwise longer1term 
social and economic costs might turn out to 
be higher than the value created, thus lead1
ing to an overall negative value1added. 
Therefore, interventions going against this 
sustainability criteria, and non1market ad 
hoc interventions, should be avoided.  
On the other hand, it is sometimes argued 
that interventions might be needed to 
guarantee or to foster sustainability. Since 
in agriculture output decisions cannot be 
made unconditionally because of the de1
pendence on nature, short1term viability of 
economic activities in agricultural produc1
tion might be critical at certain periods of 
time, while longer1term profitability and 
sustainability are not questioned. This ar1
gument is then used to justify fine1tuning 
any interventions to stabilise the market. 
The working of markets in agriculture is 
intrinsically linked with the two other cru1
cial elements for the normal functioning of 
a market economy—individual freedom and 
proper institutions (including legislation). 
For example, the institution of private 
property not only provides proper incen1
tives, but also imposes responsibility. Sound 
legislation, the rule of law, and effective 
enforcement of the law set rules of the 
game that are equal for everybody. 
A sound agricultural market policy in 
Ukraine should comprise the following 
crucial elements. 
IN MARKETS FOR PRODUCTION FACTORS AND 
OTHER INPUTS: 
• Conduct radical land reform (acceler1
ated and effective privatisation of land, 
including abolishment of the legal con1
cept of “collective property”, establish1
ment of effective land markets, etc.); 
• Liberalise the rural labour market;  
• Improve access to credit; 
• Facilitate access to machinery1service 
centres for private farmers. 
IN MARKETS FOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODI)
TIES: 
• Improve access to commodities markets; 
• Ensure market transparency (market 
information, standardisation, etc.); 
• Demonopolise the markets; 
• Develop commodity exchange and 
farmers’ markets. 
Effective farm restructuring 
Market policy is an essential element of the 
reform policy within the context of a transi1
tion economy; however, it is not the only 
aspect. A genuine restructuring policy (i.e., 
fostering and accelerating enterprise re1
                                                                    
 Institutions should be interpreted here not as 
organisations but in the sociological meaning of 
the word: institutionalised patterns of behaviour. 
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structuring) is crucial as well. While market 
policy aims at strengthening the workings 
of the market, restructuring policy focuses 
on the management and adaptation of the 
economic activities of the enterprises, and 
their interaction with the market and the 
emerging industrial organisation (espe1
cially the market structure). Integration of 
both market and restructuring policies 
should facilitate structural adjustment and, 
hence, economic efficiency and perform1
ance of the Ukrainian agricultural sector. 
A sound farm enterprise restructuring pol1
icy should include measures aimed at: 
• effective privatisation and improving of 
corporate governance; 
• enhancing management skills (consult1
ing centres, professional organisations, 
and extension services); 
• transitional measures: 
− debt restructuring; 
− social relief measures; transferring so1
cial services and social security obliga1
tions from agricultural enterprises to 
local authorities; 
− reconversion and retraining of labour; 
− regional development; 
• implementation of effective bankruptcy 
procedures. 
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Farm restructuring and land 
reform in Ukraine: Policies  
to revive the agricultural sector 
CSABA CSAKI AND ZVI LERMAN 
In Ukraine, land reform has mostly been limited to transforming state ownership 
into collective ownership, and no profound farm restructuring has yet taken 
place. There is no real development of a land market, except for leasing. The 
weak reforms have failed to radically change the traditional collective 
organisation of Ukrainian farms. Breakup of large farms has been very limited, 
as has been the case with internal restructuring. Hence, it should not be a 
surprise that the transition process is not delivering in terms of increased 
profitability and efficiency.  
At the same time, a general recovery of agriculture will also depend upon the 
implementation of basic policy measures aimed at: relaxation of inflexible 
bureaucratic procedures; introduction of hard budget constraints and 
imposition of strict financial discipline on farm enterprises; recovery of the agro
processing industry; development of competitive factor markets; liberalisation of 
external trade; and effective restructuring of farm enterprises. 
March  marked nine years since the 
launch of the land reform process in 
Ukraine and the beginning of attempts to 
transform its agriculture into a more effi1
cient and productive system based on mar1
ket principles and private ownership. In 
addition to such key elements as land re1
form and restructuring of traditional col1
lective and state farms (kolkhozes), the sec1
toral reform agenda includes liberalisation 
of the market environment, privatisation of 
agro1processing and trade, and the creation 
of a new institutional framework for agri1
culture. 
Some accomplishments have been made in 
each particular area of the reform agenda, 
but progress has been far from smooth and 
comprehensive. Agricultural reforms have 
been obstructed by the continuing struggle 
between liberal and conservative forces 
since the declaration of Ukraine’s inde1
pendence. Caught between these inner ten1
sions, the government has been unable to 
implement the required policies or prop1
erly address key reform issues.  
Status of land reform and farm restructuring 
A significant accomplishment of land re1
form after  was the transfer of state 
land to collective ownership. The share of 
the state in agricultural land dropped from 
% before  to about % in early 
. Farm restructuring, however, has 
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only been “skin deep”, merely “changing 
the sign on the door” in many cases, with 
minimal changes behind the formally new 
faзade of collective agricultural enterprises 
(CAEs)—or even their legal successors, for 
that matter. 
The Government of Ukraine realised that 
the inadequate progress with farm restruc1
turing is a major obstacle to productivity 
and efficiency improvements in agriculture. 
The presidential decree “On immediate 
measures to accelerate reform of the agri1
cultural sector of the economy” dated  
December  was intended to remedy the 
unsatisfactory situation. Pursuant to the 
decree, collective ownership was abolished; 
the former state1owned kolkhozes, now col1
lective1owned agricultural enterprises, are 
currently in the process of being again re1
organised—into joint1stock companies, lim1
ited1liability associations, co1operatives, and 
private/family farms. It was greeted with 
euphoria by supporters of agricultural re1
form and with virulent criticism by its op1
ponents, although as a matter of fact it is 
largely a reiteration of long1established 
principles that have actively guided the 
process of land reform and farm restructur1
ing in Ukraine since the beginning. 
There is considerable diversity among the 
restructured farm enterprises in Ukraine, 
and where a new generation of farm man1
agers has come in, there are often innova1
tive approaches to internal organisation 
and operations management. On the 
whole, however, the farm restructuring 
efforts so far have failed to radically change 
the entrenched collective organisation of 
Ukrainian farms. As a result, these efforts 
have failed to produce improved perform1
ance and have not led to significant break1
throughs in the transformation of Ukrain1
ian agriculture. 
                                                                    
 The information in this paper generally pre1
dates the abovementioned decree. 
Limited breakup of large farms 
During the s, agricultural enterprises 
changed their registered legal form, from 
kolkhozes to CAEs, and took over the owner1
ship of land from the state. Later, spurred 
particularly by the abovementioned presi1
dential decree, the farm enterprises moved 
from collective to private ownership, dis1
tributing land shares and asset shares to 
their individual members (in the form of 
paper certificates of entitlement, most of1
ten without physical demarcation of land or 
allocation of assets to individuals). Yet, 
their internal structure remains largely that 
of the former collective, with very few in1
stances of determined or creative efforts to 
reorganise the farm enterprises into 
smaller, functionally independent units. 
Even in international donor projects, which 
are run by experienced market1oriented 
managers and are intended to provide 
training ground for farm restructuring on a 
national scale, farms are being restructured 
on a predominantly one1to1one scale. 
Among the  farm enterprises having 
participated in the Ronco/USAID farm 
restructuring project in Ukraine, % have 
reorganised into a single legal entity, an1
other % have divided into two legal enti1
ties, and only % have split into more than 
two legal entities. The (much smaller) IFC 
project managed to produce a somewhat 
higher proportion of large farm break1ups: 
here, the  parent farms split on average 
into  successor enterprises each (Table ). 
Overall, however, we observe a limited 
break1up of large farms, and the restruc1
tured entities are still much larger, and 
therefore much less manageable, than typi1
cal farms in market economies. 
The creation of new legal or corporate enti1
ties may be accompanied by the emergence 
of clusters of private/family farms (fermy in 
Ukrainian). In the international donor pro1
jects,  base farms have produced more 
than , private/family farms, based on 
the land and assets withdrawn by shareown1
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ers from the former CAEs (Table ). This 
process contributes to the overall diversifi1
cation of farm structures in Ukraine, and to 
a certain downsizing of the large farm en1
terprises. 
Table .  Breakup statistics on large farms in international donor 
projects in Ukraine 
 IFC Ronco/USAID All projects 
Parent farms (restructured)    
Successor farms    
Enterprises     
Private/family farms  , , 
Average number of successor enterprises  
per parent farm 
. . . 
Average number of private/family farms  
per parent farm 
. . . 
Source: Interviews with managers of international donor projects in Kiev. 
Limited internal restructuring 
Formal reorganisation, involving a change 
of legal registration and distribution of land 
shares and asset shares to individuals, is a 
prerequisite for the internal regrouping of 
productive resources in entities wishing to 
more closely attune themselves to market 
operations. Unfortunately, in Ukraine (as 
in the rest of the former Soviet Union), 
formal reorganisation of farm enterprises 
has not been accompanied by any meaning1
ful internal restructuring. In a  World 
Bank study, % of farms reported that 
they retained a central management body 
patterned on the former collective farms; 
only % reported greater shifts of respon1
sibility to autonomously operating func1
tional subdivisions. 
However limited, restructuring has pro1
duced a definite favourable impact on la1
bour relations and worker behaviour in the 
reorganised farms. Managers of reorgan1
ised farm enterprises give a much more 
positive assessment of the behavioural pat1
terns of their workers than managers of 
non1reorganised farms. Significant deterio1
ration of basic behavioural variables of farm 
workers is reported much more frequently 
by managers of non1reorganised farms than 
by managers of reorganised farms (Chart 
).  
Chart . Negative evaluation of 
worker behaviour (deterioration 




















Source: World Bank farm survey,  
October–December .  
Managers of reorganised farm enterprises 
believe in what they are doing; nearly % 
are convinced that the situation at their 
farms will improve as a result of reorganisa1
tion. Managers of non1reorganised farms 
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are much more pessimistic on this point, 
and most expect their situations to deterio1
rate or, at best, remain unchanged.  
Limited improvements in 
profitability and efficiency 
Because of the lack of meaningful internal 
restructuring, Ukrainian farm enterprises 
have not made significant labour force ad1
justments, and the reorganised farms con1
tinue to employ roughly the same number 
of workers per hectare of land as before the 
reforms. Lack of this labour adjustment 
depresses profits, which in turn prevents 
the inflow of new investments. Because of 
the reluctance to shed excess labour, and 
the shortage of investment funds, restruc1
turing has not led to breakthroughs in pro1
ductivity or efficiency improvements. 
Table  presents a comparison of the sales 
margins at reorganised and non1
reorganised farms for  and the third 
quarter of . The margins are all nega1
tive, because the farms predominantly re1
ported losses for these periods. The non1
reorganised farms, however, had more 
negative profit margins (higher loss rates) 
than the reorganised farms both in  
and in . 
Table .  Margins of sales:  and  
percent of sales 
   (Q) 
 Number of farms Sales margin Number of farms Sales margin 
Non1reorganised farms  
−  − 
Reorganised farms  
−  − 
Source: World Bank farm survey, October–December . 
Reorganised farms also appear to be more 
efficient than non1restructured farms when 
efficiency is measured by the relationship 
among all inputs employed and all outputs 
produced. Regression estimates indicate 
that reorganised farms generate % more 
sales on average at each level of resource 
use than non1reorganised farms (the rele1
vant resources include land, labour, live1
stock, and purchased farm inputs such as 
fertilisers, chemicals, and fuel). 
Table .  Median yields in farms of different categories 
kg/ha for crop products; kg/cow/year for milk 
 Reorganised farms Non1reorganised 
farms 
Private/family farms 
Wheat , , , 
Vegetables , , , 
Potatoes , , , 
Sugar beets , , , 
Sunflower , , , 
Milk , , , 
Source: World Bank farm survey, OctoberDecember . 
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Crop yields, as a measure of partial produc1
tivity of land, show a mixed picture across 
farms of different categories, including 
non1restructured collectives, restructured 
corporate farms, and private/family farms 
(Table ). Overall, it is impossible to state at 
this stage that the productivity of land in 
reorganised enterprises is significantly 
higher than in non1reorganised ones, or 
that it is higher in individual farms than in 
enterprises. 
A clearer restructuring effect is observed in 
the productivity of livestock (Table ). Milk 
yields are much higher for individual farms 
than for enterprises; also, they tend to be 
somewhat higher for reorganised enter1
prises than for non1reorganised ones. 
Land market limited to leasing 
One specific level where significant changes 
are being observed is that of leasing rela1
tions. Land leasing has two different conno1
tations in Ukraine. In addition to conven1
tional leasing, which implies transfer of use 
rights to a specific plot of land for a specific 
term, leasing may also involve transfer of 
land shares from individual shareholders to 
farm enterprises or other individuals. Cur1
rently this is the dominant form of land 
leasing in Ukraine, although the practice of 
leasing physical plots is growing. 
Leasing of land shares is a paper transac1
tion that does not entail specific, properly 
demarcated plots of land. A farm enter1
prise, by leasing land shares from individ1
ual shareholders, simply assumes the legal 
right for using the area of land represented 
by the sum total of the leased land shares—
land that has always been cultivated by that 
farm enterprise and is in effect recorded as 
a kind of privatised collective property on 
its books. A private farmer leasing land 
shares from other individuals has to negoti1
ate the allocation of specific land plots with 
the local farm enterprise, which acts as an 
administrator and guardian of all undis1
tributed farm land. 
Leasing of land shares by individuals to en1
terprises is being formalised on an increas1
ing scale through legal contracts that spec1
ify the terms of the lease and spell out the 
distributions (in cash or in kind) that the 
shareholder can expect from the lessor. 
However, the end result in most cases 
merely ensures the survival of the tradi1
tional large farm enterprise, under its tradi1
tional centralised management: the share1
holders tend to lease their land shares to 
their farm enterprise, and the manager of 
the former collective continues to control 
most of the original land through a formally 
restructured successor entity. This is per1
haps an unavoidable outcome of the spe1
cific methodology prescribed by Ukrainian 
legislation and advocated by international 
donors: much emphasis is given to the 
technical stages of initial distribution of 
land shares and too little attention is paid to 
the substantive stages of regrouping of 
shareholders in smaller market1oriented 
units. 
Buying and selling of farmland is virtually 
nonexistent in Ukraine, primarily because 
of the continuing legal moratorium on such 
transactions. Yet transactions in land shares 
among individuals and between individuals 
and enterprises are legally allowed, provid1
ing a working mechanism for adjustment of 
farm sizes. 
As throughout the rest of the Europe and 
Central Asia region, farms are growing 
mainly by leasing, not by accumulation of 
private land through purchase transactions. 
According to a World Bank farm survey 
conducted in October–December , 
private/family farmers in Ukraine have 
increased their limited holdings from  
hectares to  hectares, on average, by leas1
ing land. Some % of private/family 
farmers in the study report that they lease 
land; moreover, % report that they lease 
land from private individuals—a phenome1
non never observed previously. Although 
there is no information on how much land 
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private farmers lease through land shares, 
and how much in the form of physical plots, 
it is clear that the state is no longer the sole 
source of leased land in Ukraine. 
Some enterprising individuals lease large 
blocks of land shares from former collective 
members (both active workers and pen1
sioners), thus competing as lessors with the 
former collective farms. In this way they 
accumulate enough land for an individually 
operated farm of viable commercial size. In 
the present survey, such individual lease1
holder farms (generally registered as legal 
entities) control on average , hectares, 
compared with  hectares for the conven1
tional private/family farm in Ukraine. The 
number of shares actually used by the large 
single1founder farms is thus substantially 
greater than the number of shares contrib1
uted just by the founders: in the survey, 
these farms employ  land shares per 
founder, while the multi1founder farms 
(created by over  founders) employ basi1
cally one share per founder (see Table ). 
Table .  Singlefounder and multifounder farms* 
Type of farm Percent of 




Total number of 




employed on farm 
Single1founder farms  ,   
Multi1founder farms*  , .  
* more than  founders; most farms in the singlefounder category have – founders. 
Source: World Bank farm survey, October–December . 
Contrary to earlier concerns, the individual 
leasing practice has not resulted in massive 
rural unemployment. The large individual 
leaseholders employ on their farms the 
same proportion of shareowners as the cor1
porate farm enterprises: about half the 
shareholders are actively employed, while 
the remaining half are pensioners and 
other passive players (Table ). 
Differences between individual leasehold 
farms and corporate successors of former 
collectives will begin to be felt to the extent 
that the founders of large leasehold farms 
indeed behave as owner1operators and not 
as managers of assets entrusted to their care 
by former employees. Without a real owner1
ship1driven change in incentives, the large 
leasehold farms may potentially deteriorate 
into the same mould as the former collec1
tives. 
Household plots remain the basis 
for individual agricultural 
activity 
Household plots continue to maintain their 
critically important role for rural families. 
Household plot production accounts for 
nearly % of rural family income (product 
sales plus value of own production con1
sumed; Chart ), and begins to exceed the 
share of salaries (in cash and in kind) in 
family income. Household farming appears 
to be developing beyond the traditional 
subsistence mode: % of households in 
the  survey report sales of farm prod1
ucts from household plots, and these 
households sell, on average, about half of 
their output. This naturally focuses the at1
tention on the need for the development of 
marketing channels accessible to small in1
dividual producers, not only to the tradi1
tional large farms. 
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Source: World Bank farm survey,  
October–December .  
The December  presidential decree 
reinforced the possibility for individuals to 
withdraw their land shares from the former 
collective in physical form, with the pur1
pose of augmenting their household plot. 
Contrary to previous practice, this no 
longer requires registration as a legal entity. 
Land withdrawn from the collective can 
now be cultivated by physical persons with1
out registering officially as private farmers. 
This certainly constitutes a significant re1
laxation of the bureaucratic procedures 
that may have deterred potential farmers 
during the s. 
Policy measures for agricultural recovery 
While farm restructuring generally has the 
potential for improving productivity and 
efficiency of agriculture, the accomplish1
ments in Ukraine have been very modest. 
The major reason for this is that the overall 
economic and policy environment has not 
improved—and so, quite to the contrary, it 
has remained the major impediment to 
creating market1based agricultural enter1
prises. Additionally, the continuing decline 
in the overall economy and the lack of re1
covery in the non1agricultural parts of the 
rural sector have further limited the scope 
of any meaningful restructuring in the 
farming sector. 
Comparative analysis of all European and 
Central Asian countries suggests that genu1
ine macro1economic and political reforms, 
combined with overall economic recovery, 
are the driving forces for reform and eco1
nomic recovery in the agricultural sector. 
Countries in the advanced stages of overall 
economic reforms, with healthy GDP 
growth, also show respectable agricultural 
performance. General economic recovery is 
closely correlated with market1oriented 
policy and institutional reforms. Thus, it is 
hard to expect significant recovery in 
Ukrainian agriculture, despite its restruc1
turing efforts, as long as economic decline 
continues and as long as policy and institu1
tional reforms remain sluggish. 
Prospects for the revival of Ukrainian agri1
culture will largely be determined by the 
government’s willingness to adopt a num1
ber of basic policy measures, aimed at: 
• relaxation of inflexible bureaucratic 
procedures inherited from the com1
mand1administrative regime; 
• introduction of hard budget constraints 
on farm enterprises (to be implemented 
in conjunction with a comprehensive 
program of old debt restructuring and a 
tangible threat of bankruptcy proceed1
ings for farms that default on new debt); 
• recovery of the agro1processing industry; 
• development of competitive factor mar1
kets; 
• liberalisation of external trade; 
• effective restructuring of farm enter1
prises; 
• development of alternative employment 
opportunities in rural areas to allow 
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shedding of agricultural labour as a pre1
requisite for productivity improvement; 
• speedy resolution of the impasse in the 
maintenance and development of rural 
social infrastructure, through allocation 
of necessary budgets to local govern1
ments. 
Let us discuss some of the relevant policy 
areas in more detail. 
Recovery of agroprocessing 
industry 
Recovery of agro1processing needs to be 
facilitated by creating a secondary market 
for enterprise shares and a conducive cli1
mate for direct foreign investment. For1
mally, agro1industrial privatisation has pro1
ceeded reasonably well. The number of 
agro1industrial enterprises privatised to the 
extent of % or more increased from 
, in  to , in , out of a total 
of ,. Demonopolisation of the agro1
industrial sector is being aggressively pur1
sued by the Ukrainian Anti1Monopoly 
Committee, which has broken up more 
than % of the monopolies in the sector. 
However, privatisation based on ownership 
by managers, workers, and raw1material 
suppliers has failed to produce more effi1
cient agro1processors. Most agro1processing 
in Ukraine still operates with weak corpo1
rate governance, low levels of capacity utili1
sation, and outdated equipment. As a re1
sult, it cannot produce quality products, 
and its output remains uncompetitive even 
in domestic markets. The level of foreign 
investment is minimal, which prevents 
technological upgrading. 
Development of competitive factor 
markets 
Open and competitive factor markets need 
to be created in the sector, including a 
market for agricultural land. 
Shortly after independence, a moratorium 
was placed on the sale of agricultural land, 
even if privately owned. The Ukrainian 
government argues that various decrees 
and normative acts since then have reduced 
the applicability of the moratorium only to 
the land allocated for free to individual 
smallholders by local municipalities. The 
parliament, however, continues to declare 
that there is a moratorium on the sale of 
land. 
The government has responded by prom1
ulgating joint normative acts of the State 
Committee on Land Reform and the Minis1
try of Justice: (a) give the right to two or 
more members of a farm enterprise to 
withdraw with adjacent land plots; (b) limit 
to three months the time within which a 
farm enterprise has to give its consent to 
the withdrawal of land plots requested by 
one or more members; and (c) limit to one 
year the time within which exiting members 
must be given actual possession of their 
land plot. Further actions are needed to 
facilitate the emergence of a land market, 
including the creation of a uniform cadas1
tre system. The revision of the law on land 
cadastre is an essential precondition for 
land market development in Ukraine. 
Liberalisation of external trade 
External trade liberalisation needs to be 
continued. In  and early , the gov1
ernment appeared to be committed to re1
fraining from intervention in agricultural 
import and export markets (e.g., imposi1
tion of import and export quotas, export 
taxes, or export registration requirements). 
However, by mid1, the parliament had 
imposed duties on the export of live ani1
mals and hides. Also, in October , it 
adopted the Law “On the regulation of ag1
ricultural product imports”, which estab1
lished quotas on the import of certain cate1
gories of live animals and fresh, refriger1
ated, and frozen meat. This law increased 
the protection of the agro1industrial sector 
from about % to almost %. 
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Partly as a result of these measures, agricul1
tural sector imports fell by % in . In 
, the government managed to convince 
the parliament to grant exemptions for the 
exports of pelts, which are processed 
abroad and re1imported as semi1finished 
goods. With this measure, the negative im1
pact of the export taxes on primary agricul1
tural producers has been limited. Unfortu1
nately, in , export taxes were intro1
duced on sunflower seeds and there has 
been increased pressure to introduce quo1
tas and further restrictions on imports. 
These measures represent a departure from 
the initial course of foreign trade liberalisa1
tion. 
Effective restructuring of farm 
enterprises 
Finally, Ukrainian farm restructuring must 
proceed on a wider scale, with genuine 
farm privatisation and improvement in 
corporate governance. The management of 
large farms has changed little, with no re1
wards for efficient use of capital and higher 
labour productivity. In , % of large 
farms reported losses. Most of the large 
farms have a significant amount of accumu1
lated debts, and the government must de1
velop effective strategies to remove the debt 
burden as part of the process of farm re1
structuring, and introduction of hard 
budget constraints for the future. 
After eight years of reforms, only % of 
agricultural land in Ukraine is cultivated by 
individuals (private/family farms and 
household plots), and most Ukrainian agri1
culture still remains essentially collectiv1
ised, despite the diversity of organisational 
forms that have emerged since . More1
over, the growth of private/family farming 
has slowed considerably since , and the 
number of private/family farms appears to 
have stagnated (at least temporarily) at 
,, with two percent of the agricultural 
land and about the same share of agricul1
tural output. 
Hence, the continuation of farm and agro1
processing privatisation, improvement of 
corporate governance, and facilitation of 
private investment and credit to farms and 
agro1processors should be the main com1
ponents of the policy framework for reviv1
ing Ukraine’s agriculture. This agenda, if 
implemented, will encourage domestic and 
foreign investors to make the necessary 
capital available for improving facilities and 
productivity in primary agriculture, input 
supply, and storage, handling, and process1
ing of food products. It will create a suppor1
tive policy and an institutional environment 
for market reforms in the rural economy, 
and strengthen Ukraine’s ability to achieve 
the beginning of an overall economic re1
covery as a prerequisite for real restructur1
ing of the food and agricultural sector. 
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Financing problems in Ukrainian 
agriculture: Diagnosis and 
possible solutions 
LUDWIG STRIEWE, STEPHAN VON CRAMON1TAUBADEL, AND KONSTANTIN SIRIN 
In Ukraine, agricultural enterprises depend almost exclusively on shortterm 
external capital, while the share of bank credits in external financing is 
constantly shrinking. Input suppliers and the state remain the major lenders to 
agricultural enterprises. As of the end of , the total debt of Ukrainian 
agricultural enterprises exceeded  billion hryvnias (around $bn). While the 
debt burden is rather low by international standards, indebtedness remains a 
severe problem due to the low profitability of farms. 
Agricultural enterprises are not able to attract needed external financing due to 
their low profitability, high production risks, lack of creditworthiness, 
significant transaction costs, and lack of collateral. However, the problem is 
aggravated by the weakness of the banking sector in Ukraine. In addition, the 
necessary institutions (including efficient bankruptcy and banking laws, 
bookkeeping systems, and the credit registry) are not in place. Consequently, in 
order to overcome financial problems in agriculture, Ukrainian government 
policy should address all these concerns.  
“On the Establishment of a Credit System 
for Rural Estates in Mecklenburg” was the 
name of a competition organised by the 
Mecklenburgische Landwirtschaftsgesell1
schaft (Agricultural Society) in Germany in 
. In this competition the Land1
wirtschaftsgesellschaft was looking for an1
swers to two questions: () What are the 
obstacles to establishing a rural credit sys1
tem? and () How might such a system be 
established? It took a couple of years before 
J. H. von Thünen, one of the founders of 
agricultural economics in Germany, won 
the competition with his analysis. He 
stressed that the main obstacle was not the 
lack of capital in rural areas at that time, 
but rather the uncertainty faced by lenders. 
Lenders lacked sufficient information on 
borrowers—they couldn’t evaluate whether 
the borrowers’ enterprises were profitable 
or not—and on borrowers’ willingness to 
repay their loans. Hence, lenders couldn’t 
assess borrower creditworthiness and this 
was, according to Thünen’s findings, the 
main obstacle facing lenders who might 
otherwise be willing to supply credit. 
For the Ukrainian agricultural sector and 
rural Ukraine, Thünen’s answer is still very 
relevant. Indeed, as will be argued below, it 
is not the lack of capital but the lack of 
creditworthiness that is the main obstacle to 
                                                                    
 Cited in Neuberger, D.: Johann Heinrich von 
Thünen als Förderer der Finanzintermediation (Ros1
tock ). 
 POLICY STUDIES #, JANUARY  
establishing sound credit relationships be1
tween farms and other enterprises in rural 
areas on the one hand, and potential lend1
ers—a group that comprises input suppliers, 
banks and private money lenders—on the 
other. Other obstacles are shortcomings in 
the institutional framework that regulates 
the relationship between lenders and bor1
rowers, and problems related to the 
Ukrainian banking system.  
External financing of the agricultural sector  
in Ukraine: Current status and problems 
In contrast to Germany, for example, where 
today roughly % of the agricultural sec1
tor’s external financing is provided by 
banks and the rest through trade credits, 
the banking sector in Ukraine currently 
plays only a minor role in financing the ag1
ricultural sector. The Ukrainian banking 
system comprises the five successors of the 
large state sectoral banks, of which the most 
important for agriculture is Bank Ukraina, 
the former Agroprombank; in addition, 
more than  commercial banks emerged 
in the early s, of which  survived 
until  (see Herald, No. / –digest of 
the National Bank of Ukraine). However, 
most of the private banks have been financ1
ing the agricultural sector only to a very 
small extent, or not at all.  
Who finances farms in Ukraine? 
Table  shows that agricultural enterprises 
(AEs) rely almost exclusively on short1term 
                                                                    
 The analysis is based on the annual reports of 
the Ministry for the Agro1Industrial Complex, 
and, therefore, on the consolidated balance 
sheet for agricultural enterprises in Ukraine. It is 
clear that actually many agricultural enterprises, 
namely private/family farms and all subsidiary 
holdings, are excluded from this analysis, as no 
comprehensive data on them is available. How1
ever, there is evidence that the production of 
household plots relies to a large extent on inputs 
from former collectives, which can be seen as a 
form of external financing. Much of the high 
productivity of the household plots (they pro1
duce almost % of the gross agricultural output 
on % of the agricultural land) can be ex1
plained by their use of low1cost or free inputs 
from the former collectives. 
external capital and that the share of bank 
credits in external financing has been 
shrinking constantly. Indeed, it is negligible 
in the years after . With respect to the 
shares of equity and external capital, the 
data have to be treated with care, with the 
assessment of farm assets being especially 
problematic. The book value of farm assets 
is derived from its purchase value minus a 
certain amount of depreciation. This often 
does not correspond to its market value, 
which is presumably much lower. Further1
more, the indexation of these asset values 
in times of high or even hyperinflation also 
leads to overvaluation. 
The diminishing role of the banks can be 
explained partly by the reduction in state 
budget financing that was formerly chan1
nelled through the state banks. It is accom1
panied by an increasing role of direct state 
financing. As can be seen in Chart , in 
which the shares of total debt owed to dif1
ferent types of lenders is depicted, the 
share of debts to banks diminished to .% 
by , whereas the share of debt to the 
state increased to .%. Given a total 
amount of AE debts as of December , 
 at . billion hryvnias, the debts of 
the AEs to the state equalled . billion 
hryvnias. Most of these government credits 
were never paid back, as some agricultural 
enterprises were unable to repay; more1
over, some of the credits were misused. 
                                                                    
 The figure includes tax debts and central fund 
payments, the latter being payments the state 
made through its government agencies that pro1
vide inputs to agricultural enterprises. 
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Table .  Financing of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine 
% 
       
Equity capital in total capital . . . . . . . 
External capital in total capital . . . . . . . 
Short1term capital in total external capital . . . . . . . 
Bank credits in total external capital . . . . . . . 
Source: Ministry for the Agroindustrial Complex (–): Annual Farm Accounting Reports,  
different issues. Own calculations. 
The negative consequences of these high 
debts to the state are well known. In past 
years, the authorities have used draconian 
measures to collect their debts, e.g., they 
have confiscated grain or banned exports of 
grain and other agricultural products from 
certain regions. These measures have had 
adverse effects on the relationship between 
AEs and private input suppliers, as the lat1
ter were unable to collect payments or had 
problems exporting grain that they had 
received in payment for debt from the AEs.  
With the Law of Ukraine “On the deprecia1
tion of taxes and other dues” (No.  
dated ..), all farm debts to the 
state were cancelled. Before and after the 
cancellation of these debts (especially af1
ter), private input suppliers have been and 
remain the most important lenders to the 
AEs in Ukraine. According to the data pre1
sented in Chart , their share in the total 
debt was roughly % by the end of , 
with a total amount of claims on AEs at . 
billion hryvnias. After the cancellation of 
state debts this amount accounts for 
roughly % of total debt. The AEs’ re1
maining debt is to their employees; this 
                                                                    
 This is explained in detail in the papers of the 
German Advisory Group on Economic Reforms 
in Ukraine I, K, K, L and in von 
Cramon1Taubadel, S. and L. Striewe (eds.): Die 
Transformation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine–
Ein weites Feld (Kiel ), chapter . 
debt accounted for an almost constant 
share of –% in recent years.  
Chart . Shares of different 
























Source: Ministry for the Agroindustrial Complex 
(–): Annual farm accounting reports, dif
ferent issues. Own calculations.  
Debt burden of the agricultural 
sector 
At first glance, the total debt burden of 
Ukrainian AEs appears huge. Including the 
now cancelled debts to the state, the value 
of all debts amounted to the total volume of 
goods sold by Ukrainian AEs in . Even 
after the cancellation of the state debt, the 
remaining debt still amounts to roughly % 
of total Ukrainian GDP in .  
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Is this debt burden too heavy for the AEs 
and is it high by international standards? In 
Table , the total debt per AE is calculated 
by dividing total debt by the number of 
AEs. The average AE had a debt burden of 
,, hryvnias at the end of , and 
this was reduced to , hryvnias by the 
cancellation of state debts. This amount 
corresponds to no more than the price of a 
Western1style middle1class combine.  
Table .  The debt burden of Ukrainian AEs, per enterprise and per 
hectare, in hryvnias 
     
Total debt per AE , , ,, ,,
Remaining debt per AE without state debts , , , ,
Total debt per hectares arable land     
Remaining debt per hectares without state debts      
Source: Ministry for the Agroindustrial Complex (–): Annual farm accounting reports, different 
issues. Own calculations. 
Of course, an enterprise’s indebtedness 
cannot be measured by the volume of its 
debts alone. Instead, debts must be seen in 
relation to the enterprise’s income1
generating potential. Although there are 
some rather sophisticated measures for 
income generating potential, land is still 
the most1often used indicator, both for this 
purpose and for measuring the size of a 
farm. As the most reliable data available in 
Ukraine is on land use, we use arable land 
as a proxy for income1generating potential 
to compare the indebtedness of German 
and Ukrainian agricultural enterprises. To 
account for different product prices, in1
debtedness is converted into tons of grain, 
which is the most important arable crop in 
both countries (see chart ). Moreover, to 
account for different yields per hectare, 
indebtedness on the right side of chart  is 
expressed as a share of average annual 
revenue per hectare (which is equal to the 
price multiplied by the average yield). Al1
though it is clear that these comparisons 
use only an imperfect measure of the in1
debtedness of agricultural enterprises (in 
both countries the livestock sector is not 
taken into account), they offer some inter1
esting insights. 
Chart . Indebtedness of 
Ukrainian AEs compared to 
























Note. We used the following data: grain prices—
UAH/t in Ukraine and DM/t in Ger
many; average debt burden per hectare—UAH in 
Ukraine and DM,/ha in Germany; average 
grain yields—. t/ha in Ukraine and . t/ha in 
Germany. 
Source: Ministry for the Agroindustrial Complex 
(–): Annual farm accounting reports, dif
ferent issues. Own calculations. Bundesministe
rium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 
(): Agrarbericht der Bundesregierung  
First, note that the indebtedness per hec1
tare in tons of grain is rather low in Ukraine 
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compared to Germany, particularly since all 
debts—including the debts to the state that 
were recently cancelled—are taken into ac1
count in chart . Without these debts, the 
figure for Ukraine would be even lower, at 
just . t/ha. The same holds true for the 
debt per hectare figure measured in aver1
age revenues per hectare. Whereas a Ger1
man farm would have to spend . average 
annual revenues to settle all debts, the av1
erage Ukrainian AE could settle its debts 
with just % of an average annual revenue 
(just . average revenues if the recently 
cancelled debts to the state are left out). If 
the farms only in Germany’s New Federal 
Lands (these farms produce mainly arable 
crops and have average debts of , 
DM/ha) are considered, rather than the 
average for all of Germany, indebtedness 
expressed in revenues per hectare is  times 
higher than that of Ukrainian AEs. 
Causes of the indebtedness of 
Ukrainian AEs 
Even if the debt burden of Ukrainian AEs is 
rather low by international standards and 
compared to income1generating potential, 
the indebtedness of the agricultural sector 
remains a severe problem, because the low 
profitability of Ukrainian AEs (see table ) 
indicates that few farms realise their in1
come1generating potential. 
Table .  Profitability of Ukrainian AEs ranked by shortterm solvency 
() 
ranking according to short1term solvency Best Second Third Fourth Worst
short1term solvency coefficient* . . . . . 
profitability **  1 1 1 1 
Note. *Calculated as shortterm debt divided by liquid shortterm assets.  
**Calculated as (total revenue—total costs)/total costs x . 
Source: Sedik, David: “Causes of Debt Accumulation and Low Productivity of Ukrainian AEs” in UAPP 
This Week in Ukrainian Agriculture, Issue (), – March . 
Reasons for credit problems in Ukraine 
As was shown above, banks play only a mi1
nor role in financing Ukrainian AEs. Fur1
thermore, private input suppliers, who 
have claims of roughly  billion hryvnias on 
the AEs, have become very reluctant to fi1
nance Ukrainian AEs. A comprehensive 
analysis of the reasons for the insufficient 
external financing of the AEs has to cover 
all of the factors that affect the contractual 
relationship between lenders and borrow1
ers. It is important that these factors go be1
yond the simple question of the supply of 
money for financing Ukrainian agriculture: 
“Finance is all about risk and trust, finance 
is not all about money”. In the following 
section a broad range of preconditions that 
are necessary for lenders and borrowers to 
come to terms is discussed.  
Supply side of the credit problem 
As shown in chart , the supply of credits by 
banks and other lenders depends on alter1
native investment opportunities, the quality 
of management, transaction costs, and 
                                                                    
 v. Pischke, speaking at an ‘Expert Meeting on 
Agricultural Finance and Credit Infrastructure 
in Transition Economies’, organised by the 
OECD in Moscow (). 
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other factors such as the location of banks 
in rural areas.  
Investment alternatives determine the in1
terest rates which lenders are prepared to 
offer. If other investment projects are more 
attractive (higher expected interest rate 
and/or lower risk), lenders will be reluc1
tant to finance agriculture. This aspect was 
of great importance for Ukrainian agricul1
ture in the past, as their huge fiscal deficits 
that were largely financed by credits, gov1
ernment bonds, and T1bills led to a crowd1
ing1out effect.  
Table .  Interest rates and interest rate spreads in Ukraine  
% annual rate 
       
NBU refinance rate  . . . . . . 
Real NBU refinance rate  . . . . . . 
Commercial bank interest rates on 
credits* 
. . . . . . . 
Commercial bank interest rates on 
deposits* 
. . . . . . . 
Interest rate spread  . . . . . . . 
Real interest rate on credits* 1. . . . . . . 
Real interest rate on deposits* 1. . 1. 1. . . . 
Note. * Weighted average. 
Source: UkrainianEuropean Policy and Legal Advice Centre (UEPLAC) (), p.ff. 
When interest rates of more than % were 
paid on government debt, much of the 
banks’ credit portfolio flowed to the corre1
sponding bonds and bills, leaving less than 
% of all bank credits for the non1state 
sector (., ., and .% in  to 
, respectively). This trend was not 
reversed until , when roughly % of 
all bank credits were made available to the 
non1state sector. 
The management of banks in Ukraine is 
another critical problem. As new credit 
technologies are not used properly and 
since internal structures are complicated 
and often inefficient, Ukrainian banks have 
                                                                    
 Ukrainian1European Policy and Legal Advice 
Centre: Ukrainian Economic Trends, Quarterly 
Issue, September , published by TACIS ser1
vices DG A, European Commission (Brussels, 
November ). 
problems, for instance, with the provision 
of micro1credits. Due in part to the ineffi1
ciency of Ukrainian banks, interest rate 
spreads in Ukraine are extremely high (see 
table ).  
Of course, the interest rate spread is de1
termined not only by banks’ cost structures 
but also by transaction costs in the banking 
business in general. These are high in 
Ukraine due to risk, particularly the risk of 
inflation. If poor macroeconomic condi1
tions, for example high inflation, lead 
bankers to expect that the currency in 
which they provide credits could depreci1
ate, they will attempt to cover this risk by 
demanding higher interest rates on credits 
or shortening the terms of the credits that 
they provide. Hence, exogenous macro1
economic conditions have a direct influ1
ence on the interest rates that lenders de1
mand. It comes as no surprise, therefore, 
that in recent years Ukraine has seen inter1
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est rates as well as interest rate spreads that 
are very high, even in comparison to other 
transition countries. As can be seen in Ta1
ble , interest rate spreads in Ukraine have 
been consistently in excess of % in recent 
years. Between  and , real interest 
rates ranged from  to %. 
In the past, numbers such as those just cited 
have been used to argue that problems on 
the supply side of the market for credits are 
the reason why farms in Ukraine are under1
financed. Of course, it is true that supply1
side factors are of critical importance. Since 
long1run investments in particular will 
rarely have an expected profitability in ex1
cess of %, the fact that real interest rates 
on credits in Ukraine have been consis1
tently higher in recent years suggests that 
the supply of credits for long1term invest1
ment projects in agriculture will be negligi1
ble.  
However, supply1side factors alone are not 
enough to explain why there has been no 
supply of short1term credits to Ukrainian 
agriculture, especially to finance the pur1
chase of inputs such as fertilisers and plant 
chemicals. The period between March–
May, when key inputs are applied to crops, 
and July–August, when the harvest takes 
place, is only a few months. Over this pe1
riod of three to five months, real interest 
costs of –% are incurred in Ukraine. At 
the current, exceedingly low levels of fertil1
iser and plant chemical application in 
Ukraine, the marginal productivity of addi1
tional applications would be very high, and 
these applications would likely be profitable 
despite the high interest rates. The fact that 
short1term investments in basic yield in1
creasing inputs nevertheless do not take 
place suggests that high interest rates alone 
do not explain the lack of credits provided 
to agriculture in Ukraine. 
Chart . Determinants of credit relationships in Ukrainian agriculture 
The macroeconomic and sectoral environment in agriculture
Supply of credits:
1 alternative investment opportunities
1 management of banks
1 transaction costs
1 distribution of banks
Demand for credits:




Institutions (laws and their implementation):






What kind of terms?
 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
Another piece of evidence suggests that a 
shortage of funds and high interest rates 
alone do not explain the lack of credit pro1
vided to Ukrainian agriculture. Foreign 
banks that have considerable experience in 
agriculture 1 such as the German DG1Bank, 
the Dutch Rabobank and various interna1
tional development banks 1 have, so far, 
Distribution of information between lenders and borrowers 
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been unwilling to lend money to Ukrainian 
agriculture. This despite the fact that these 
banks refinance themselves in hard curren1
cies and, therefore, at much lower rates of 
interest. Even if it appears otherwise from a 
Ukrainian perspective, there is more than 
enough capital available in international 
markets to finance projects in Ukrainian 
agriculture. 
However, rather than benefiting from net 
capital inflows, Ukraine and Ukrainian ag1
riculture have witnessed net capital out1
flows in recent years. In other words, not 
only are Western banks and investors hesi1
tant to invest in Ukrainian agriculture, 
Ukrainians themselves go to considerable 
length to take their capital out of the coun1
try rather than invest it domestically, for 
example in agriculture. No one is willing to 
invest in Ukrainian agriculture because the 
risk of non1payment is very high. 
Demand side 
The main reason why little capital is flowing 
into Ukrainian agriculture is depicted on 
the right side of chart . Along with the re1
quirements that must be fulfilled on the 
supply side, certain requirements must be 
fulfilled on the demand side if lenders and 
borrowers are to come to terms. One neces1
sary precondition is that agricultural bor1
rowers—in other words farms—should be 
profitable or become profitable as a result 
of the planned investment. If this condition 
is not fulfilled, farmers will not be in a posi1
tion to pay back any loans they receive and 
there is no reason why potential lenders 
should provide such loans. 
Since it is known that roughly nine out of 
ten AEs in Ukraine are loss1makers, it is 
clear that this basic demand1side precondi1
tion is not met. The reasons for the lack of 
profitability are well known. Many AEs in 
Ukraine are horrendously inefficient. The 
productivity of labour on these farms is very 
low, due to the large amount of unem1
ployment that is hidden on these farms. A 
further problem is the cross1subsidisation 
of household plots. Since most AE members 
are not paid in full or on time, many are 
given access to (or take) agricultural prod1
ucts or inputs as payment in kind. This ac1
cess is often given at prices that are well 
below the market price of the products or 
inputs in question, which represents a sig1
nificant drain on the farms’ financial re1
sources. 
Another reason for the low profitability of 
farms in Ukraine is the inefficiency of the 
agricultural marketing sector. Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that prices for 
inputs in Ukraine are much higher than on 
world markets, and prices for agricultural 
outputs are much lower.  
Farms in Ukraine receive only a small pro1
portion of the final price that consumers in 
Ukraine or in world markets pay for their 
products. This is largely due to the fact that 
many links in the marketing chain for agri1
cultural products have not been privatised 
and remain highly inefficient. For example, 
loading grain from railcars onto a ship in a 
Ukrainian Black Sea port costs roughly 
 USD/t, almost twice as much as at other 
Black Sea ports. Such inflated marketing 
costs have the same effect as an export tax. 
Given that Ukraine—a relatively small coun1
try in the economic sense—is a price “taker” 
in world markets, inflated marketing costs 
are directly translated into lower farmgate 
prices. Other measures, such as the re1
gional export bans that have been imple1
mented following harvests of recent years, 
also act as indirect taxes on agriculture in 
Ukraine. By reducing farm profitability, 
                                                                    
 See, for example, Sedik, D.J.: Farm Profits and 
Agricultural Policies in Ukraine, Iowa State Univer1
sity Ukrainian Agricultural Policy Project, Work1
ing Paper No.  (Kyiv ). 
or von Cramon1Taubadel, S.; L. Striewe (eds.): 
Die Transformation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine 
– Ein weites Feld. Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk (Kiel 
). 
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these factors also reduce their access to 
credit. 
Beside the level of a farm’s profitability, 
banks and other potential lenders will also 
be concerned about the variability of its 
profitability. Even if lenders expect that a 
farm will be able to repay its debts in an 
average year, they will not lend money to 
the farm if there is a high risk that repay1
ment will not be possible in certain years. In 
this regard as well, Ukrainian farms are not 
attractive potential borrowers.  
Furthermore, on the one hand, weather 
conditions are variable, leading to the risk 
of poor harvests in certain years. There is 
little that can be done about this source of 
risk, which is faced by agricultural produc1
ers all over the world. On the other hand, 
the Ukrainian government adds to the risk 
in the form of numerous, sudden, and un1
predictable changes in policy. In recent 
years the government has resorted to re1
gional export bans, the confiscation of agri1
cultural products, export taxes on products 
such as oilseeds, and complex certification 
procedures such as those that were imple1
mented in the fall of  for grain. 
Whether or not and to what extent these 
measures were actually applied in practice, 
potential lenders are aware that such policy 
changes are especially likely in Ukraine. If 
the associated risk is too large, then they 
will refrain from lending to farms in 
Ukraine. At the very least, they will demand 
margins (interest rate spreads) that include 
a hefty allowance for political risk. 
Transaction costs on the part of a borrower 
include all those costs incurred leading up 
to the signing of a loan contract. For exam1
ple, a potential borrower must be in a posi1
tion to make a loan application that in1
cludes realistic information on the liquidity 
and profitability of his enterprise before 
and after the proposed investment, includ1
ing a realistic assessment of the risks associ1
ated with this investment. Not only does a 
business plan include information that is 
needed to assess the profitability of a pro1
posed investment, it also signals that the 
responsible manager knows his operation 
and is able to manage it. Experience in 
Germany and other countries shows that 
potential lenders such as banks are not just 
on the lookout for good projects, they are 
also on the lookout for competent manag1
ers. 
Finally, the collateral that a firm can offer 
plays a vital role in determining whether or 
not it is able to secure credit. Farms in West 
Germany, for example, have an equity ratio 
(the ratio of equity to the total value of all 
assets) of roughly % on average. Hence, 
these farms are, on average, able to use eq1
uity, such as land or machinery, to secure 
loans. If a bank believes that a farmer’s eq1
uity is sufficient to cover the amount of a 
loan, and if the bank is assured that it will 
have a legal claim on this equity in the 
event that the farmer does not repay his 
loan, then the risk associated with granting 
this loan is reduced considerably from the 
bank’s perspective. 
In the new Federal Land of Eastern Ger1
many, where roughly % of all land is 
rented and most farms have a correspond1
ingly low equity ratio, access to credit is 
comparatively difficult. In many cases, farm 
managers have reacted by offering personal 
belongings (e.g., houses, cars) as collateral 
for loans. Even though the value of these 
personal belongings may be much smaller 
than the loans they are used to secure, in 
this way managers are at least able to signal 
to banks that their investment plans are well 
thought through and that they have every 
incentive to repay their debt. 
Institutions 
Even if all of the preconditions on the de1
mand and supply sides of the market for 
credit in Ukrainian agriculture were ful1
filled, it is not likely that many credit con1
tracts would actually be signed. In other 
words, even if interest rates in Ukraine were 
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much lower and farms were both profitable 
and able to provide securities, banks would 
still be hesitant to provide these farms with 
loans. The reason for this hesitation is that 
banks and other lenders are not in a posi1
tion to enforce their claims on farms be1
cause the required legal instruments are 
missing. In chart , these instruments are 
labelled “institutions”. 
An important concept in this regard is that 
of the distribution of information, and the 
so1called information asymmetry. Note that 
the root of the word ‘credit’ (Lat. credere, to 
believe, to trust) indicates that trust is a key 
ingredient in the successful completion of 
credit contracts. It is difficult for banks in 
Ukraine to trust potential borrowers, be1
cause they are not in a position to judge 
whether these borrowers will be able and, 
most important, willing to repay. In other 
words, banks cannot judge the creditwor1
thiness of potential borrowers. This is due 
to the following factors: 
. When judging a potential borrower’s 
creditworthiness, banks find that farm 
financial statements in Ukraine are of 
little value. While these financial 
statements do include information on 
profits and losses in past years, it is well 
known that accounting practices and 
standards in Ukraine are riddled with 
weaknesses. Several examples of this 
were discussed above where we re1
ferred to official misrepresentation as 
well as forced and deliberate fabrica1
tion.  
. The prevalence of barter transactions 
in Ukrainian agriculture also makes it 
difficult for external evaluators to as1
sess the actual profitability of a farm in 
Ukraine. It is often next to impossible 
to determine what prices underlie such 
transactions (e.g., when milk is ex1
changed for butter, which in turn is ex1
changed for shoes and, finally, diesel 
fuel, as one farm manager once ex1
plained to us), and often the same 
product is bought (or sold) at prices 
that can vary considerably depending 
on the market channel employed. 
. Even if it were possible to evaluate the 
profitability of a farm in the past (and 
the points made above suggest that this 
is not the case), future profitability 
would remain elusive. How an enter1
prise such as a farm will fare following 
an investment is difficult to answer 
even in Western economies under the 
relatively stable conditions prevailing 
there. In an economic environment 
such as that in Ukraine, it is essentially 
impossible to answer this question, es1
pecially if data from the past are unre1
liable. 
All of this suggests that it is very difficult for 
banks to evaluate whether farms in Ukraine 
will be able to repay loans. A second, 
equally important aspect of creditworthi1
ness is whether farms will be willing to re1
pay. This is where the issue of information 
asymmetry arises. When a farm does not 
repay a loan, it is often difficult for lenders 
to determine whether this is due, for ex1
ample, to a poor harvest because of bad 
weather or crop disease, or whether this is 
due to farm managers’ hiding and/or farm 
members’ stealing some part of the harvest, 
as is often reported. Of course, borrowers 
who do not repay a loan will always claim 
that it is due to bad weather or other un1
foreseen developments. In many cases, this 
will be true, but in others it represents 
fraud. An information asymmetry exists, 
because while the borrower is aware of the 
real reasons for his non1repayment, the 
lender is not aware and cannot determine 
the real reasons without incurring consid1
erable expense, if at all. 
Of course, banks and other potential lend1
ers know that farm managers and the 
members of AEs in Ukraine have strong 
incentives not to repay loans. This will in1
fluence the banks’ lending practices. In 
many cases, information asymmetry will 
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lead banks to refuse to grant loans even to 
farms that appear likely to repay. Hence, 
information asymmetry, although it ap1
pears at first glance to be a problem faced 
by banks and other potential lenders, is 
really a problem for farms in Ukraine. In1
formation asymmetry means that even 
farms both able and willing to repay cannot 
receive loans. 
Market economies have developed a variety 
of institutions to combat information 
asymmetry. Many of these institutions take 
the form of laws that are designed to pro1
tect lenders, for example banks. These in1
stitutions include credit registries, trans1
parent accounting systems, and bankruptcy 
laws. 
In Germany, the Netherlands, and many 
other countries, households and firms can 
be identified as credit risks in a central 
credit registry. The principle behind these 
registries is simple. When a lending institu1
tion grants a loan to a borrower, it informs 
the credit registry of the identity of the bor1
rower and the terms of the loan. In return, 
the lender can direct questions to credit 
registry and receive information on the 
borrower’s credit history. If a potential 
borrower has a bad credit record, the 
lender will be warned and can take appro1
priate precautions. Note as well that a cen1
tral credit registry greatly increases the costs 
of non1repayment. Borrowers have a strong 
incentive to repay because they know that 
they will be listed as credit risks in the cen1
                                                                    
 Of course, the protection of privacy is very 
important. Credit registries are only permitted 
to release information under highly regulated 
conditions. A borrower must be informed that 
the information he includes in his loan applica1
tion will be made available to the credit registry, 
and he must grant a lender access to information 
on his credit history from the registry. A poten1
tial borrower can deny access to information on 
his credit history from the central registry, but it 
is clear that lenders will hesitate to lend money 
to such a borrower. 
tral registry in the event of default, and that 
this will make it much more difficult for 
them to secure loans in the future. 
All steps that make it easier for lenders to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of their po1
tential borrowers also contribute to a re1
duction of information asymmetry. A de1
pendable and transparent system of ac1
counting and financial statements is clearly 
of great importance in this regard. 
Bankruptcy laws are among the most im1
portant institutions in the market for 
credit. By protecting lenders in the face of 
information asymmetry, bankruptcy laws 
increase the willingness of banks and other 
lenders to provide loans to agriculture. 
Therefore, rather than being seen as a 
threat, bankruptcy laws, as a precondition 
for providing credit to agriculture, are ac1
tually in the best interests of farms. The 
following parameters are key determinants 
of the effectiveness of a bankruptcy law: a) 
the criteria used to determine insolvency 
and trigger bankruptcy proceedings; b) the 
scope for negotiations and debt restructur1
ing that can or must take place before a 
firm is liquidated; and c) the order in which 
various lenders enforce their claims.  
Without going into detail on all of these 
points, recent experience in Ukraine dem1
onstrates that the state has made extensive 
use of numerous tools (such as aggressive 
tax collection practices) to ensure that its 
claims receive preferential treatment. As a 
result, banks and other potential lenders 
are especially hesitant to lend money to any 
enterprise in Ukraine that has tax or other 
debts to the state (and this includes the vast 
majority of all enterprises, not just in agri1
culture). 
According to experts, Ukraine’s bankruptcy 
law is one of the best in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). Hence, Ukraine does not 
need a new law but rather the will and the 
capacity to implement the existing law. 
Currently there is a moratorium on bank1
ruptcies in agriculture until January , 
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. It goes without saying that potential 
lenders will hesitate to provide credit to 
farms under these conditions. After all, why 
should they be willing to provide credits to 
farms that run almost no risk in the event of 
non1repayment? Hence, the moratorium on 
bankruptcy proceedings in agriculture, 
while it may appear to benefit individual 
farms, represents a tax on agriculture as a 
whole in Ukraine.  
In this context, it is important to stress that 
the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings is 
not in the primary interest of banks. Bank1
ruptcy proceedings are costly and often 
only lead to partial recovery of debts. Banks 
are generally interested in conventional 
repayment and in building long1term rela1
tionships with established customers. Banks 
prefer functioning bankruptcy laws because 
of their impact on borrowers’ behaviour in 
an environment characterised by informa1
tion asymmetry, not as a means of collect1
ing loans. 
Developing agricultural credit markets in Ukraine 
Policy implications 
Many of the preconditions and institutions 
that are required for the development of an 
efficient credit system for agriculture 
(Chart ) are not fulfilled or available in 
Ukraine. One exception is Ukraine’s bank1
ing laws, which are highly ranked in com1
parison to those in other countries of the 
FSU. The EBRD, for example, in a study of 
the depth and effectiveness of banking 
laws concludes that the depth of Ukraine’s 
banking laws can be ranked at . on a scale 
of  (bad) to  (very good). While some 
states in Central Europe receive a better 
ranking (for example Hungary, with a rank1
ing of ), Ukraine has one of the best rat1
ings in the FSU. 
However, the other prerequisites and insti1
tutions presented in Chart  and discussed 
above are not assured in Ukraine. Table  
lists a number of policy measures that 
would create a positive environment for the 
development of an agricultural credit sys1
tem in Ukraine. Using the scheme followed 
above, these are divided into measures on 
the supply side (banks and other lenders), 
measures on the demand side (farms and 
agricultural markets), and measures for the 
creation of institutions. As all of these pre1
                                                                    
 See the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s  Transition Report. 
requisites and institutions have been dis1
cussed above, there is no need for a de1
tailed discussion of Table  here.  
Note, however, that it would be unwise to 
focus exclusively on agricultural land when 
discussing collateral for loans. First, it is 
conceivable that banks and other lenders 
could be given a legal claim on future har1
vests that they could invoke in the event of 
non1repayment. Second, it is conceivable 
that borrowers could use personal belong1
ings as collateral, as discussed above. Fi1
nally, so1called group credits could be used 
to provide banks and other lenders with 
collateral. In this case, several households 
or small firms join together to form a group 
and guarantee each others’ debts. If one of 
the members of the group does not repay 
his debts, then no further credit is made 
available to any of the group’s members. In 
this way the information asymmetry prob1
lem can be significantly reduced, because 
individual members will have an incentive 
to monitor each others’ behaviour to en1
sure repayment and, if need be, to help 
each other out with this repayment. 
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Table .  Policy measures for improving the functioning of the 
agricultural credit market in Ukraine 
Supply side 
Measures to increase the 
supply of credits 
Institutions 
Measures for the protec1
tion of lenders’ interests
Demand side 
Measure to improve the profitability 
of farms 
. General measures to 
strengthen the banking 
system: 
•  reduction of inflation; 
• development of the 
market for collateral. 
. Increasing the efficiency 
of the banking sector: 
•  development of new 
forms of securing bank 
loans; 
•  use of micro1credit 
technologies; 
•  restructuring of banks; 
•  education and training 
of bank employees and 
regulators. 




. Implementation of a 
credit registry. 
. Lifting the morato1
rium on bankruptcy 
in agriculture. 
. Introduction of a le1
gal framework for the 
use of mortgages. 
. Restructuring of AEs. 
. Increasing competition in the sec1
tors up1 and downstream from ag1
riculture: 
•  privatisation of state enterprises; 
•  improving climate for domestic 
and foreign investors. 
. Liberalisation of agricultural 
markets: 
• elimination of trade restrictions; 
• elimination of barriers to trade 
within Ukraine; 
• elimination of all forms of price 
intervention. 
. Information and training for farm 
managers on the preparation of 
loan applications, financial state1
ments, etc. 
Source: Own presentation. 
Effect of the role of the state on 
agricultural credit markets 
In almost all countries of the world, some 
farmers (and entrepreneurs in other sec1
tors) feel that their demand for credit at 
reasonable rates of interest is not satisfied. 
This often leads to calls for state interven1
tion. It is interesting to consider what role 
the state can play in stimulating the provi1
sion of credits to agriculture. Three basic 
forms of state intervention can be identi1
fied: the direct provision of credit by the 
state, interest rate subsidies financed by the 
state, and credit guarantee funds. These 
three forms are discussed in turn below. 
DIRECT PROVISION OF CREDIT. Many diag1
noses of agricultural credit markets identify 
market failure, i.e., they conclude that for 
various reasons (e.g., the inherent risk of 
agricultural production) private credit 
markets will never provide the socially op1
timal amount of credit. Based on such di1
agnoses, analysts sometimes conclude that 
the state must directly intervene by provid1
ing credit to individual enterprises.  
However, state intervention that is de1
signed to counteract ostensible market fail1
ure must solve many difficult problems. 
Indeed, J. D. von Pischke stresses: “... to 
the best of [my] ... knowledge, government 
or donor intervention motivated by the 
desire to overcome market failure in a de1
veloping or transition economy has never—
never—produced a viable credit institution 
or program”. The reason for this very pes1
                                                                    
 von Pischke, J.D.: “Preconditions for Sustain1
able Agricultural Finance and Credit Systems” in 
Agricultural Finance and Credit Infrastructure in 
Transition Economies, Proceedings of an OECD 
Expert Meeting (Paris ). 
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simistic conclusion is clear: state lending 
institutions must operate in the same envi1
ronment as private institutions. While state 
lending institutions may be able to refi1
nance themselves at lower rates (at the ex1
pense of taxpayers), they are nevertheless 
confronted with the problems of risk and 
information asymmetry that private lenders 
also face when dealing with agriculture. 
Experience in countless projects in coun1
tries all over the world has demonstrated 
conclusively that the state is no better able 
to identify creditworthy borrowers than 
private lenders are. Moreover, state lending 
institutions are often under considerable 
political pressure to provide loans to loss1
making enterprises. This has been amply 
demonstrated by the experience with state 
subsidies for farms in Ukraine in recent 
years. These subsidies, which have often 
taken the form of credits, have helped 
many AEs avoid necessary restructuring. As 
a consequence, they have fostered a highly 
irresponsible attitude towards debt repay1
ment on the part of many farm managers, 
and they have fuelled large budget deficits 
in Ukraine, thus contributing to macro1
economic imbalance and, inter alia, high 
interest rates in Ukraine. 
INTEREST RATE SUBSIDIES. Interest rate sub1
sidies have been demonstrated to be a very 
inefficient means of increasing the provi1
sion of credit to agriculture. In Germany, 
studies have demonstrated that there is no 
significant relationship between the provi1
sion of subsidised credits to farms and im1
provements in the efficiency of these farms. 
In many cases, interest rate subsidies have 
simply lowered the costs of loans that farms 
would have taken without the subsidy in the 
first place. Interest rate subsidies have also 
proven to be ineffective in many other tran1
sition economies because even at signifi1
cantly lowered rates of interest, banks are 
still confronted with the problems of assess1
ing creditworthiness in the face of asym1
metric information. Interest rate subsidies 
in Ukraine cannot compensate for the fact 
that farms are not in a position to provide 
collateral, and that there is a moratorium 
on bankruptcy proceedings in agriculture. 
Because of these factors, banks are con1
fronted with a significant risk of non1
repayment, regardless of the interest rate 
they charge. 
CREDIT GUARANTEE FUNDS. Lack of collat1
eral is one of the major reasons why farms 
cannot secure loans. The moratorium on 
the implementation of the bankruptcy law, 
and various aspects of land laws in Ukraine, 
are at the root of this problem. However, 
even if these problems could be solved, 
some farms (e.g., those that rent most of 
their land) might face difficulties securing 
loans. Credit guarantee funds can provide a 
solution to these difficulties. Basically, a 
credit guarantee fund is an amount of 
money which the state provides as a “substi1
tute” for the physical collateral that poten1
tial borrowers are unable either to offer or 
to offer in sufficient quantities. 
There are examples of transformation 
economies in which credit guarantee funds 
have led to an increased rate of loan provi1
sion to agriculture and an increased rate of 
loan repayment. However, it must be 
stressed that the beneficial effects of credit 
guarantee funds are limited. Credit guaran1
tee funds do not make farms more profit1
able per se, and they are no substitute for 
necessary restructuring. Moreover, credit 
guarantee funds can also have negative ef1
fects if they become too large or are ex1
tended to farms that are not creditworthy. 
In particular, credit guarantee funds can 
lead to a moral hazard problem if lenders, 
secure in the knowledge that the state is 
providing collateral, increase their propen1
sity to finance riskier projects and/or bor1
rowers. For this reason, relatively successful 
credit guarantee programs, such as the Ru1
ral Credit Guarantee Fund that operated 
between  and  in Hungary, only 
issued guarantees for a portion of the 
amount of the loans granted. 
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Oilseeds: A potential success story 
running the risk of policy 
mismanagement? 
STEPHAN VON CRAMON1TAUBADEL AND LUDWIG STRIEWE 
The Ukrainian oilseed industry has until recently been relatively successful, and 
managed to attract significant foreign investment. This suggests that the sector is 
internationally competitive and that policy distortions which have discouraged 
investment in other areas of agriculture have had a less damaging effect on 
oilseeds. Moreover, in the near future, the Ukrainian oilseed industry might 
benefit from the projected increase in world demand for oils and fats. 
Meanwhile, current government policy is badly hampering the strengthening of 
the sector, which would allow Ukraine to tap into excellent export potentials. In 
particular, policymakers introduced an export duty on oilseeds. Such 
intervention is capable of eliminating any incentive for increased efficiency, and 
hence, the effects of this policy measure will be quite harmful for the 
international competitiveness of the Ukrainian oilseed industry. Moreover, 
Ukraine has already incurred a significant net welfare loss as a result of the 
export duty. 
Ukraine is one of the world’s major oilseed 
producers. Together with grains and sugar 
beets, oilseeds—in particular, sunflower 
seeds—are a pillar of Ukrainian crop pro1
duction. While grain and sugar beet pro1
duction in Ukraine fell by % and %, 
respectively, between  and , sun1
seed production fell by “only” %. Rape1
seed production has increased significantly 
in comparison to other crops in recent 
years, albeit from an initially low level. 
These developments suggest that oilseed 
production in Ukraine has been less af1
fected by the negative influences that have 
led to a collapse of grain and, especially, 
sugar beet production since the beginning 
of transition. Farmers in Ukraine have ob1
viously decided to allocate scarce produc1
tive resources from other crops to oilseeds. 
The expansion of sunflower seed and rape1
seed production in Ukraine since  is 
primarily due to economic considerations 
and particularly the relatively high profit1
ability of oilseed production in comparison 
to other crops. Ukrainian oilseeds are in1
ternationally competitive and, until re1
cently, there have been comparatively few 
problems along the marketing chain.  
Farms in Ukraine have not only been in a 
position to use the promise of future deliv1
                                                                    
 For a detailed analysis, see: von Cramon1
Taubadel, S. and L. Striewe (eds.), Die Transfor
mation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine – Ein weites 
Feld (Kiel ), Chapter . 
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eries of sunflower seeds to secure crucial 
inputs such as fuel and fertiliser, they have 
also been able to actually deliver the prom1
ised sunflower seeds to private input sup1
pliers (who, unlike state input supply struc1
tures, have also been able to actually deliver 
the required inputs). Moreover, input sup1
pliers could be reasonably certain (at least 
until recently) that they would be able to 
export any sunflower seeds they received in 
payment for inputs. 
But in September , the Ukrainian gov1
ernment imposed a % tax on oilseed ex1
ports. This suggests that policymakers in 
Ukraine were not satisfied with develop1
ments in the oilseed market and perceived 
a need to correct these developments. Since 
the performance of oilseed production in 
Ukraine was relatively positive, one might 
conclude that there is little need for policy 
intervention. As the saying goes, “If it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it.” 
The whole story of the export tax seems 
even stranger, because the future of oilseed 
production in Ukraine looks promising as 
well: worldwide demand for oils and fats is 
projected to grow significantly in the near 
future particularly due to the increase in 
consumption in heavily populated coun1
tries such as China and India. Significant 
potential for increased demand also exists 
in Eastern Europe, as well as parts of Africa 
and Latin and Central America.  
To meet the expected increase in world 
consumption of oils and fats, it would be 
necessary to increase oilseed acreage. Pre1
sumably it would not be possible to con1
tinue increasing oilseed areas worldwide, as 
has occurred over the last  to  years. 
Therefore, it appears likely that worldwide 
oilseed production would increase less rap1
idly in the future than it has in the past. 
Altogether it can be expected that the com1
petition between grains and oilseeds for 
scarce farmland would increase in coming 
years. If this forecast is accurate, then the 
prospects for Ukraine, as a country with a 
large agricultural area and untapped poten1
tial, are excellent. Assuming an area of be1
tween . and  million hectares for sun1
flower seed production and the –% 
higher yields that could be obtained, it 
should be possible to generate significant 
profits for producers, processors, and ex1
porters. Ukrainian producers could market 
a total sunflower seed harvest of .–
. million tons at home and abroad with1
out putting significant pressure on world 
market prices. 
It is important to note, however, that the 
production and marketing of such a large 
sunflower seed crop could not be induced 
overnight, and certainly not if current agri1
cultural and economic policies are main1
tained in Ukraine. It is not sufficient to 
merely appeal to Ukraine’s large agricul1
tural potential. Potential alone is worth lit1
tle unless it is tapped properly. Indeed, 
some experts are of the opinion that an 
excessive preoccupation with the potential 
of Ukrainian agriculture has distracted the 
sector from the need to implement major 
reforms. Good soils are certainly not a suf1
ficient condition for profitable agriculture, 
and experience in many countries that are 
less endowed with agricultural potential 
than Ukraine demonstrates that good soils 
are not even a necessary condition. 
To become a global player in world markets 
for oilseeds and oilseed products, Ukraine 
will have to dismantle many barriers in the 
areas of production, processing, transport, 
and trade. However, in almost all areas, 
Ukraine’s agricultural policy has so far cre1
ated more problems than it has solved. 
These problems are sectoral and not prod1
uct1specific. An example of such policy 
action is the tax on oilseed exports, which is 
analysed below. 
                                                                    
 Since this issue has been discussed extensively 
elsewhere, it will not be repeated here. See, for 
example, ibid., chapters , , and . 
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A critical analysis of the tax on oilseed exports 
In July , presidential decree No.  
stipulated that sunflower seed exporters 
must pay a deposit that would only be re1
imbursed after the corresponding export 
revenues had arrived and been duly proc1
essed in Ukraine. Before this decree could 
be implemented, however, massive protests 
by exporters, agricultural producers, and 
international donors led to its withdrawal. 
Further suggestions on how to control or 
limit exports were made in the following 
months, and on  July , parliament 
passed a law calling for a % tax on oilseed 
exports. After a veto and negotiations be1
tween the parliament and President Ku1
chma, a % tax on oilseed exports became 
law in September . 
The export tax on oilseeds is very contro1
versial. It is a major point of conflict with 
the IMF. Why has the government of 
Ukraine maintained this policy even 
though it threatens relations with the IMF? 
Three arguments that are often cited by 
Ukrainian proponents of the export tax are 
presented and analysed below. 
Argument :  
Without the export tax, most Ukrainian sunflower 
seeds would be processed abroad. Ukraine ends up 
reimporting these sunseeds in the form of sun
flower oil. Ukraine would be better off if the proc
essing of sunflower seeds to sunflower oil—and the 
associated valueadding activity—took place at 
home. 
This argument in favour of the oilseed ex1
port tax is cited more often than any other. 
In Chart , the basic idea behind this ar1
gument is presented schematically.  
The large circle in chart  represents the 
total value1added of the Ukrainian econ1
omy; it occurs in agriculture, in the oilseed 
processing industry, and in other parts of 
the economy. The state secures a portion of 
this value1added via tax revenues and other 
activities. The small circle in Chart  repre1
sents the value1added that oilseed process1
ing plants abroad generate using Ukrainian 
oilseeds. Proponents of the oilseed export 
tax argue that this tax has forced Ukrainian 
oilseeds to stay in Ukraine and be processed 
there, thus effectively shifting the value1
added in the amount of the small circle in 
Chart , from foreign oilseed processors to 
domestic processors. In other words, these 
proponents argue that the oilseed export 
tax has shifted value1added that was taking 
place abroad into Ukraine, thus making 
Ukraine better off than it was. 
Chart . Valueadded in the 
Ukrainian economy prior to the 











Source: Own presentation.  
This argument is, however, based on an 
inaccurate view of how the economy works. 
Without the export tax, oilseeds are proc1
essed abroad because oilseed1processing 
plants abroad are much more efficient than 
those in Ukraine. If this were not the case, 
the Ukrainian oil processors would have no 
difficulty in outbidding foreign competi1
tors for sunflower seeds produced in 
Ukraine. Furthermore, if Ukrainian oilseed 
processing plants were not less efficient, 
then their sunflower oil would have no dif1
ficulty competing with imported sunflower 
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oil. Since this is not the case, Ukrainian oil 
processing plants are obviously not as effi1
cient as their competitors abroad. This im1
plies, however, that when a ton of sunseeds 
is processed in Ukraine, less value is added 
then when the same ton of sunseeds is 
processed abroad. The argument that the 
oilseed export tax simply shifts value1added 
from abroad into Ukraine is therefore 
flawed.  
The sunseed export tax, by distorting prices 
and incentives, forces value1added activity 
that would otherwise take place abroad to 
take place in Ukraine. As a result of these 
distortions, value is added in Ukraine, but 
less is added all together than would other1
wise be the case. This is illustrated in 
Chart . 
Chart . Changes and 
redistribution of valueadded in 
the Ukrainian economy as a 
result of the tax on oilseed exports 
The state















The export tax leads to reduced sunflower 
seed prices in Ukraine. This, of course, has 
a negative effect on the producers of sun1
flower seeds (farmers). All other things be1
ing equal, the artificially reduced prices for 
                                                                    
 In other words, producing one litre of sun1
flower oil in Ukraine uses more resources (espe1
cially energy, but also raw sunseeds) than the 
production of an equivalent litre abroad. 
sunflower seeds make sunseed processing 
in Ukraine appear to be more profitable. 
The oilseed processing plants in Ukraine 
profit as a result and their value1added in1
creases, but it comes at the expense of the 
farmers who produce the sunflower seeds.  
Hence, the oilseed export tax does not shift 
value added from abroad into Ukraine, but 
rather shifts value1added from Ukrainian 
farmers to Ukrainian oilseed processors. In 
Chart , this is represented by an increase 
in the share of the value1added circle that 
accrues to oilseed processors, and a corre1
sponding reduction in the share that ac1
crues to farmers. In Chart , we can also see 
that farmers lose a portion of their initial 
value1added to the state in the form of the 
export tax. Foreign oilseed processors are 
forced to use less Ukrainian sunflower 
seeds, but it is safe to assume that they will 
be able to secure enough raw material—
sunseeds and/or other oilseeds from else1
where—and that they will, therefore, suffer 
temporary losses at most. 
Since the export tax was implemented, 
more processing has taken place in the less 
efficient Ukrainian oilseed processing 
plants. Therefore, as discussed above, less 
value is added altogether. Thus, the impact 
of the export tax is not limited to the trans1
fers between farmers and processing plants 
shown above. Instead, Ukraine as a whole 
also suffers a net welfare loss. In other 
words, what farmers lose as result of the 
implementation of the export tax is not 
fully transferred to the oilseed processing 
plants and the state. These transfers are not 
perfect, but rather are accompanied by wel1
fare losses, due to the inefficient allocation 
of resources. As a result of the export tax, 
therefore, Ukraine’s total value1added in 
Chart  is reduced by an amount that is 
                                                                    
 See von Cramon1Taubadel, S. and L. Striewe 
(eds.), op. cit., Chapter  and, in particular, Box 
1. 
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represented by the small circle labelled 
“welfare loss”. 
The various losses and transfers involved as 
a result of the sunseed export tax were es1
timated by the Centre for Privatisation and 
Economic Reform in . A % export 
tax would lead to a USDm loss for farm1
ers, and gains of roughly USDm and 
USDm for oilseed processing plants and 
the state, respectively. Depending on the 
length of the time horizon that is consid1
ered, the annual net welfare loss for 
Ukraine as a result of the oilseed tax varies 
between . and . million USD. Of 
course, in order to produce such estimates 
it is necessary to make many simplifying 
assumptions; hence, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, they 
provide a reasonable estimate of the magni1
tude of the effects that the oilseed tax can 
be expected to have induced in Ukraine. 
Argument :  
Farmers do not suffer from the export tax because 
the state has directed its revenues from this tax 
back to agriculture. Hence, the export tax has 
helped oilprocessing plants without harming any 
other group in Ukraine. 
This argument is based on the idea that the 
state can use its revenues from the oilseed 
export tax to compensate farmers so that 
they would be just as well off after the im1
plementation of the tax as they were be1
forehand. In the final analysis, therefore, 
the oilseed tax leads to a situation in which 
farmers and the state are just as well off as 
before, and the oilseed processing plants 
are better off. 
Beyond the question of whether the state 
really has directed its revenues from the 
                                                                    
 See Center for Privatization and Economic 
Reform, The Economic Effect of Export Duties on 
Ukrainian Sunflower Seeds, Iowa State University’s 
Ukraine Agricultural Policy Project, Occasional 
Paper No.  (Kiev ). 
oilseed export tax back to oilseed produc1
ers, it is easy to demonstrate that this argu1
ment is invalid. First, it ignores the net wel1
fare loss that was discussed above. Due to 
the net welfare loss, the export tax is not a 
“zero1sum1game”; some groups in the econ1
omy must be worse off after the tax is im1
plemented than before. Furthermore, the 
state’s revenues from the oilseed export tax 
are considerably smaller than the losses 
sustained by farmers, because the export 
tax only applies to sunflower seeds that are 
exported, while farmers suffer from lower 
prices on their entire harvest. 
Argument :  
Without the export tax, farmers in Ukraine would 
produce more sunflower seeds than is indicated by 
good agronomic practice. Hence, the export tax on 
sunflowers has led to a necessary reduction in the 
sunflower seed acreage. 
The export tax on oilseeds has been de1
fended by government officials as necessary 
to keep farmers from producing sunflower 
seeds too frequently on the same acreage. 
Even if it is true that the current crop rota1
tion is too “tight” (it is generally recom1
mended that sunflower seeds not be sown 
more frequently than every – years on the 
same acreage), this argument is highly sus1
pect. Are we to believe that bureaucrats in 
Kyiv know more about farming than practi1
tioners in the countryside in Ukraine? Are 
farmers in Ukraine so poorly trained or so 
inexperienced that a paternalistic state 
must intervene to prevent them from hurt1
ing themselves? 
The answer to these questions is, of course, 
no. Farmers are well aware of the risks asso1
ciated with producing sunflower seeds. The 
fact that they are prepared to run the risks 
associated with a tight sunflower seed rota1
tion is no argument for increased state in1
tervention but is rather an indication of just 
how damaging Ukraine’s ill1advised agricul1
tural policy has been to date. It also reflects 
the fact that the expected profitability of 
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other crop activities, such as grain or sugar 
beet production has, until recently, been 
very low. In other words, agricultural pol1
icy in the years since independence has left 
farmers with no alternative but to farm in a 
way that is not consistent with good agro1
nomic practice. Rather than reducing the 
profitability of one of the few remaining 
profitable crops for farmers in Ukraine, 
policymakers should concentrate on reduc1
ing the distortions that make other crops 
unprofitable. 
The real reasons? 
The driving force behind the implementa1
tion of the export tax for oilseeds is the oil1
seed processing industry, which has en1
gaged in intensive lobby activity in Kyiv. 
This is a perfectly legitimate activity in a 
democracy; various groups have the right to 
articulate their interests and to try to con1
vince policymakers to implement measures 
that further these interests. If economic 
policy is to be successful in the long run, 
however, it cannot be focused exclusively 
on serving partial or sectoral interests. At1
tempts to stimulate the economy by means 
of special subsidies and support for indi1
vidual industries will only lead to a heavy 
burden of direct and indirect taxes for the 
economy as a whole, and less, rather than 
more, economic activity altogether overall. 
                                                                    
 In , the profitability of grain production 
increased considerably as Ukraine moved from 
an export to an import situation. If the next 
grain harvest is as good as is currently expected, 
Ukraine will return to an export situation and 
grain prices can be expected to fall significantly. 
Hence, the current profitability of grain produc1
tion is likely to be short1lived and the argument 
made above remains valid. For a detailed discus1
sion of grain markets and grain market policy in 
Ukraine see von Cramon1Taubadel, S., After De
cree No. : Grain Market Policy in Ukraine, Ger1
man Advisory Group Paper O, December 
. 
In the case of the tax on oilseed exports, 
there is reason to believe that the interests 
being served are especially partial. Only a 
few oilseed processing plants are responsi1
ble for a large proportion of the oilseed 
processing in Ukraine. Of these, still fewer 
have the resources required to purchase 
sunflower seeds; many of the other plants 
are not in a position to increase their capac1
ity utilisation, even at the lower sunflower 
seed prices brought about by the export 
tax. This suggests that the benefits of the 
oilseed tax are concentrated on a select few 
oilseed processing plants. Specifically, ex1
perts point to the processing plants in Dni1
propetrovsk, Poltava, and Polohiv 
(Zaporizhia oblast) as well as a new facility 
in Donetsk. 
The fundamental problem with most oil1
seed processing plants in Ukraine—and this 
is a problem shared by the agricultural 
processing industry in general—is that they 
are not internationally competitive. A fu1
ture1oriented policy must be primarily con1
cerned with correcting this lack of competi1
tiveness, and not simply disguising it at the 
expense of other sectors of the economy.  
The competitiveness of the Ukrainian oil1
seed processing industry can only be im1
proved with the help of investments and 
modern technology. High prices for sun1
flower seeds are not the main barrier to 
such investments. On the contrary, sun1
flower seed processors in other countries 
operate profitably on the basis of sunflower 
seed prices that are higher than those 
prevalent in Ukraine. The main barrier to 
investment is a problem that affects not 
only the oilseed processing industry but 
actually just about every branch of the 
Ukrainian economy—that is, the poor in1
vestment climate in Ukraine. Plans for the 
construction of new oilseed processing fa1
                                                                    
 For a more detailed discussion, see: von 
Cramon1Taubadel, S. and L. Striewe (eds.), op. 
cit., Chapter . 
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cilities and/or the modernisation of exist1
ing facilities in Ukraine are locked away in 
the desks of competent and well1financed 
firms around the world. However, these 
plans, and the promise that they represent, 
will remain locked away as long as the con1
ditions for domestic and foreign invest1
ment in Ukraine are not improved. The 
export tax on sunflower seeds is an expen1
sive medicine that merely treats the symp1
toms of a much more serious disease. Other 
transformation economies, such as Poland 
and Hungary, have been much more suc1
cessful at combating this disease, because 
they have concentrated on fighting its cause 
rather than doctoring its symptoms. 
Future prospects 
Ukrainian agriculture could participate in 
and benefit from the increase in worldwide 
demand for agricultural products that is 
expected in the coming years. The potential 
growth in demand for oilseeds—particularly 
sunflower seeds and rapeseed—is especially 
large. The combination of Ukraine’s com1
parative advantage and increasing world1
wide demand and prices is especially prom1
ising. 
Before the export tax on oilseeds was im1
plemented, oilseed production in Ukraine 
benefited from the fact that it seemed to be 
largely ignored by policymakers. The de1
velopment of oilseed production prior to 
the implementation of the export tax dem1
onstrates that private input supply and out1
                                                                    
Ibid., Chapter . 
Note that oilseed processors in Ukraine would 
also benefit from improved access to imported 
sunseeds and raw oil (in other words, a reduc1
tion of tariff and non1tariff barriers). This would 
enable them to improve their capacity utilisation 
in the summer months prior to harvest. At the 
moment, reduced tariff rate quotas are distrib1
uted periodically, but in a very ad hoc manner 
that is not transparent and probably associated 
with extensive rent seeking. 
put marketing structures can be much 
more effective than state structures. The 
central government’s withdrawal in  
from input supply activities in the agricul1
tural sector of Ukraine is a positive step 
which indicates that policymakers have 
learned this lesson. 
The abolition of the export tax on oilseeds 
would represent an additional positive step. 
In  a consultant team in Ukraine wrote 
the following: “Two years ago, the World 
Bank already saw the comparative advan1
tage of sunflower production in Ukraine. 
Despite recently reduced yields, the com1
parative advantage holds true. The only way 
Ukraine could lose its comparative advan1
tage in sunflower growing is because of po1
litical decisions...” Unfortunately, it ap1
pears that the reservations expressed by 
these consultants was realised in the form 
of the export tax. 
                                                                    
 Final Report, Gesellschaft für Agrarprojekt 
mbH, Ukraine Edible Oilseed Processing Project 
(Hamburg ). 
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Ukrainian sugar: Developing an 
industry restructuring policy plan 
FRANK BOSTYN AND ANDRIY BOYTSUN 
The Ukrainian sugar industry has declined sharply over the last decade. In 
general, the industry cannot withstand competition in the world market, both in 
terms of quality and price, and hence, the whole sector needs redressing. From 
an economic point of view, the straightforward answer would be to discontinue 
growing sugar beets altogether; however, at social and political level, the 
immediate social fallout in terms of layoffs looms large. Pressure from within is 
high to keep sectors artificially going with heavy state intervention and 
subsidisation, but that kind of solution is not sustainable in the long term. 
Nevertheless, the government has continued to apply mainly ad hoc measures to 
artificially support the sector, while a longterm strategy is still missing. A 
successful longterm strategy should include measures aimed at ensuring 
efficiency at both macro and microeconomic levels, while also addressing social 
problems. 
Ukraine’s sugar industry is confronted with 
tremendous problems, the nature of which 
is not unique. The breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and the disintegration and reform of 
the economy meant also the loss of the tra1
ditional market for Ukrainian sugar. The 
real reasons are not political, but purely 
economic: Russia, the main importer of 
Ukrainian sugar, now has a wide opportu1
nity to buy for better terms in the world 
market. This observation points immedi1
ately to the heart of the matter—structural 
competitiveness in the Ukrainian sugar 
sector. 
From an economic point of view, the solu1
tion would be very straightforward: stop 
growing and refining sugar. The challenge 
remains huge, however, at the social and 
political level; the immediate social fall1out 
in terms of lay1offs looms large. Hence, 
seemingly sound economic policies are 
confronted with the insurmountable chal1
lenge of making them politically accept1
able. 
This kind of problem is not new to history. 
Many have lived through the shutdown of 
coalmines, steel mills and shipyards in 
Europe, the sanitation of textile industries 
in Belgium, etc. There are basically two 
questions that have to be answered in this 
regard:  
. what is the future of the sector (i.e., can 
it be/become competitive), and  
. what policy measures should be taken 
to turn the sector around or even to 
shut it down, without social outburst 
and with an efficient transfer of labour 
into other sectors. 
Many transition economies are facing prob1
lems of this nature in defining industrial 
policies. Pressure from within to keep sec1
tors going artificially with heavy state inter1
vention and subsidisation is high, but that 
kind of solution is not sustainable in the 
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long term. It also justifiably upsets interna1
tional financial institutions. Apart from the 
fact that it cannot be a real solution to the 
problem, it might disrupt the whole transi1
tion process. The extent of the restructur1
ing challenge is so broad that even a minor 
level of subsidisation leads to structural 
budget deficits, putting any serious attempt 
of macroeconomic stabilisation at risk. 
However, neither will simplistic solutions 
do the job. Immediate and unconditional 
shutdown of a whole industry might be a 
convincing solution on paper, but cannot 
be expected to be manageable in reality. 
Governments thus need well1balanced pol1
icy schemes which effectively lead to the 
sanitation and redressing of the sector, 
while also dealing with reconversion.  
At the same time, these schemes must be 
convincing and acceptable for the main 
international financial institutions. Rela1
tions with these important players should 
not be disturbed, because the transition 
economies are mostly—and hopefully only 
for the time being—quite dependent on 
their support. Also, any policy scheme for 
industrial restructuring would most proba1
bly need input from those institutions 
and/or from the wider donor community, 
which is usually very sensitive to the opin1
ion of the international financial institu1
tions. 
Ukrainian sugar industry: Decline and decay 
Performance  
Beetroot production in  was . mil1
lion tons, which amounts to only % of 
the  output. Productivity (i.e., yield) 
has been falling significantly and now is at 
less than half of the world average and 
about a third of the productivity in Europe; 
in , yield was . tons per hectare 
(against . t/ha in  and an average 
. t/ha in the – period). Area 
under beetroot shrank to about , 
hectares in . Interestingly, the first 
signs of decay in the sector showed long 
before , which means that the transi1
tion is in no way the single factor causing 
the decline.  
Sugar production fell correspondingly, 
from  million tons in  to . million 
tons in . The production of sugar from 
beetroot was . million tons (. million 
tons in ); the rest of the production 
accounts for sugar processed from raw cane 
sugar. Simple calculations show that despite 
the decline in beetroot sugar, a trend for 
increasing production from raw sugar has 
emerged in the past few years. 
Chart . Beetroot production in 



































Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.
Many representatives of the sugar industry 
would claim that Ukraine has a good tradi1
tion of producing sugar and is capable of 
producing as much as  million tons of this 
commodity a year. However, this only 
represents the industry’s technical capabil1
ity, and the underlying economic ques1
tion—whether the sector is competitive—is 
ignored. A broader screening of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the sector is 
summarised in the table below. 
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Table .  Strengths and weaknesses of Ukraine’s sugar industry 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Sugar beet production 
. Good natural potential: 
• Large area of rich soils available for sugar 
beet production; 
• Sufficient climatic conditions (up to  days 
in the south); 
• Favourable geographical location between 
East and West. 
. Sufficient labour resources. 
. Large and undivided arable areas. 
. Lack of an appropriate input base (chemi1
cals, transport, machinery, etc.) 
. Unaffordable prices of agricultural machin1
ery (combine harvesters) 
. Obsolete and worn1out irrigation system, 
half of which is more than  years old. Un1
satisfactory privatisation in irrigation. 
. Insufficient storage facilities on farms. 
. Lack of monogerm seeds. 
. Lack of knowledge, experience and educa1
tion for profitable private farming. Needs 
for management and marketing skills. 
. Lack of financial and managerial experi1
ence needed for the new market economy 
conditions. 
. Absence of organisational background for 
professional and inter1professional nongov1
ernmental producer associations on na1
tional and regional levels. 
. Feed production not related to animal hus1
bandry needs. 
Processing 
. Large number of suppliers. 
. Evenly distributed processing capacities 
linked to railways. 
. Capacities have good growth potential. 
. Qualified personnel with a longstanding 
professional tradition. 
. Current over1capacity, obsolete equipment 
at the refineries. 
. Barter and illegal transactions caused by re1
fineries’ indebtedness, not allowing them to 
show any funds in their accounts. 
. Excessive energy consumption. 
. Currently, insufficient demand from the 
confectionery industry. Lack of up1to1date 
technologies and equipment for small and 
medium1sized confectionery enterprises. 
. Continuous lack of working capital. 
. Insolvency throughout the industry. 
. Lack of investment. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
Market and sales potential 
Domestic market 
. Good domestic market coverage: baked 
goods, brewery, spirits, and feed milling. 
. Promising domestic market for the confec1
tionery industry. 
. Uncompetitive cost of sugar as compared 
with the world market price. 
. Actual monopoly on sugar refineries: most 
refineries are subordinated only to the for1
mer state committee Ukrtsukor. Domina1
tion of new cartels in the industry. 
Export market 
. Long1term relations and good possibilities 
with Russia and other FSU countries. 
. Interesting prospective markets in Middle 
and Far East. 
. Severed links with FSU partners at the offi1
cial level; shrinkage of exports to Russia. 
. Underdeveloped trading infrastructure, es1
pecially for export. 
. Quality grading inconsistent with interna1
tional standards. 
. Lack of export credits or guarantees. 
State policy in the sugar sector 
. Privatisation. Transitioning from the ineffi1
cient control and command system towards 
more efficient self1organised free1market 
management. 
. Continued government support to the sec1
tor. Indecision regarding the shutdown of 
inefficient enterprises. 
. Unfinished privatisation and incomplete 
farm restructuring. Lack of a legislative, or1
ganisational, and financial background to 
complete the restructuring successfully. 
. Inappropriate privatisation policy for the 
processing industry. 
. Lack of a comprehensive or consistent price 
policy. 
Source: Bostyn, Frank (), Strategy paper on market and price policy for Ukrainian Agriculture,  
Tacis FD UK  – Agricultural Policy Advisory Service.
From this, sustainable competitiveness is 
not apparent. Stefan von Cramon1
Taubadel conducted a thorough analysis 
                                                                    
 See von Carmon1Taubadel, Stefan, “Der Markt 
für Zucker in der Ukraine: Gestern, Heute und 
Morgen”, in Stefan von Carmon1Taubadel & 
of sugar production’s competitiveness. His 
conclusions are very straightforward and do 
                                                                                      
Ludwig Striewe (eds.), Ein weites Feld: Die Trans
formation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine (Göttin1
gen ) 
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not provide an optimistic view for a sustain1
able future for Ukraine’s sugar industry. 
One reason is that Ukrainian sugar is of 
poorer quality and does not comply with 
international standards. The other, more 
important reason is price. Ukraine’s sugar 
industry has much higher costs, resulting 
from two major factors: () beetroot sugar 
is generally less competitive than cane 
sugar, () the country’s sugar production is 
inefficient.  
Chart . World price for white 
sugar and production costs of 
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Source: S. von CramonTaubadel, “Der Markt für 
Zucker…”.
Note: ISA is the International Sugar Agreement, 
which was adopted under the auspices of UNCTAD 
in  and entered into force in January . 
One of the objectives of ISA is to collect statistical 
information, perform its analysis, and publish 
sugarrelated information. In particular, the ISA 
price is a very important reference for sugar special
ists. For more information, see 
http://www.isosugar.org/. 
The inefficiency of Ukrainian sugar refiner1
ies is caused by a number of factors, such as 
input supply problems, poorer technical 
capabilities and outdated equipment of the 
                                                                    
 Ukraine has  sugar refineries, most of 
which are loss1making. 
refineries, lower sugar content in beetroot, 
lower sugar extraction, etc. Another factor 
is the small capacity of most of the refiner1
ies, further increasing their average pro1
duction costs. However, even though the 
capacities are small, they are underutilised 
(average capacity utilisation is less than 
%); also, due to energy supply problems, 
the period during which sugar is produced 
is unreasonably long (about  days). Com1
bined, these factors contribute to the ex1
tremely high cost of Ukrainian sugar and 
lead to a huge difference in the cost of 
Ukrainian sugar and world prices. 
As illustrated in Chart , the average world 
price for sugar is around $/tonne, while 
Ukrainian sugar producers claim that their 
costs are much higher and, therefore, insist 
on a minimum price covering those costs. 
The state gave in and set minimum prices 
for sugar at , hryvnias per tonne. This 
decision was, in fact, a follow1up to the ear1
lier Law “On the state regulation of sugar 
production and sales”, which has further 
complicated the situation in the industry. 
Some aspects of the current 
government policy in the sector 
It may seem that the Law “On the state 
regulation of sugar production and sales” is 
aimed at reducing the number of produc1
ers and thus improving their capacity utili1
sation, but a closer look shows that the ef1
fective objective is absolutely not in line 
with realistic economic goals. The law pro1
vides for quotas A, B, and C. Quota A is the 
limitation on sugar produced domestically 
                                                                    
 See, for example 
http://www.ukrsugar.kiev.ua; last accessed on 
 June . 
 About $. See Resolution of the Cabinet of 
Ministers “On certain issues of state regulation of 
sugar production and sales” (No. , dated  
June ). 
 Adopted on  June . 
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for the domestic market (currently set at . 
million tons), Quota B is for sugar exported 
under intergovernmental agreements, and 
Quota C is the rest of the sugar produced 
and destined only for export. Those enti1
tled to Quotas A and B enjoy guaranteed 
sales at guaranteed prices. 
The authors of this system claim that this is 
exactly the way sugar market is regulated in 
the European Union when surplus pro1
duced sugar is exported. However, there is 
a serious difference between the two: the 
European Union subsidises exports, thus 
maintaining the balance in the industry, 
while Ukraine does exactly the opposite by 
only subsidising the production allowed for 
the domestic market. As a consequence, the 
law sets an oligopoly of producers who have 
dominated the industry.  
Therefore, the law is aimed at reducing the 
number of producers and thus improving 
capacity utilisation, but not on a competi1
tive basis. Those privileged producers with 
direct access and impact on the decision 
makers get the Quota A, but they are not 
necessarily the most efficient or viable ones. 
This law creates no incentives for the indus1
try. On the contrary, it reflects a major 
backtrack of Ukraine’s policy, because cost1
based pricing and guaranteed sales are 
pretty much the same as the state order. 
What is even worse, the social effects—
which have been so much advocated by in1
                                                                    
 Production and price formation in Ukraine’s 
agriculture is generally distorted by the existence 
of monopolies. Even though regulation updates 
have tended to liberalise the market through so1
called free prices and less control, monopolies 
still seem to be intact and remain close with the 
administration. Beyond the obvious distorting 
effects on competition, monopolies are obstacles 
to modernisation and therefore to productivity 
improvement, as well as subsequent price mod1
eration within a free competition network. This 
essentially resulted from privatisation taking 
place without prior dismantling of the former 
state monopolies. 
dustry spokespersons—are not taken into 
account at all. This policy does not solve the 
actual problem (i.e., improve the efficiency 
with mitigation of social effects). On the 
contrary, it does not necessarily even im1
prove the efficiency of the privileged pro1
ducers, but liquidates—without differentia1
tion or consideration for economic viabil1
ity—the other two1thirds of the refineries, 
without mitigation of social effects. 
Apart from the fact that this policy is not 
really addressing the issue of effectively 
redressing the sugar industry into a viable, 
competitive, and sustainable sector, it has 
at least two other negative outcomes: () 
social discontent resulting from the dete1
riorated conditions at most factories (or 
their shutdown) is highly possible, and () 
domestic consumers will be paying much 
more for sugar. Not only will consumers pay 
more, the sugar market can now be ma1
nipulated more easily. Ukraine already ex1
perienced sugar market deficits, distor1
tions, and illegal imports in June  and 
June , which were caused by market 
agitation resulting from traders trying to 
artificially increase prices immediately be1
fore the sugar refining season starts. 
Ukraine is also now importing white sugar, 
not only raw cane sugar as it did before. 
Then again, if the state policy was to secure 
market stability and guaranteed satisfaction 
of domestic demand, these market distor1
tions should have been pre1empted. 
One can wonder why there is still a market 
deficit, with all the support of the govern1
ment and the capacity to produce enough 
sugar at home. One of the reasons is the 
country’s policy with respect to agricultural 
imports. The current import duty imposed 
on raw sugar is % of the customs value; it 
makes it more expensive than sugar pro1
duced domestically and thus prevents raw 
sugar imports. However, this is another 
example of the short1sightedness of the pol1
icy: in the short run, the government helps 
sugar refineries withstand market pressure, 
but it ruins the industry in the long run 
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(since sugar refineries’ capacities are un1
derutilised, but capacity utilisation could 
be improved due to raw sugar imports) and 
makes domestic consumers poorer by forc1
ing them to pay a higher price for sugar.  
The need for a longterm vision 
Sugar beet production is Ukraine’s tradi1
tional agricultural commodity, and was part 
of the industrial revolution in agriculture at 
the end of the th and beginning of the th 
century. Today, the world’s technology of 
sugar refining has advanced and mostly 
turned towards cane sugar processing. In 
addition, the broken links with former So1
viet Union partners and the failure of the 
former “state order” system have prevented 
Ukraine from maintaining its sugar pro1
duction levels. In this context, Ukraine has 
very few trump cards to compete with in the 
world sugar market, or even in sugar1beet 
production against European producers, 
except for cane sugar processing. 
The Ukrainian sugar industry has two ma1
jor economic problems: high costs and un1
favourable market conditions. The eco1
nomic goal, therefore, must be to decrease 
the price and the costs as much as possible, 
mainly by a better organisation of the sector 
on the basis of its comparative advantages. 
This would lead to a significant shrinkage 
of the sector. However, instant shutdown of 
many refineries would in fact mean the loss 
of jobs for many people, because the refin1
eries actually represent whole towns where 
most of the population is employed at the 
refineries. Thus, the situation represents a 
huge practical problem and a nearly impos1
sible political challenge. 
                                                                    
 In the past few years, though, the government 
has adopted ad hoc resolutions for every season, 
allowing duty1free raw sugar imports in the 
amount necessary to offset the sugar deficit in 
the domestic market. The most recent example 
is a resolution allowing the import of , 
tons of raw sugar at a duty of euro per ton. 
Up to now, the government has offered 
only short1term solutions to the immediate 
needs of the producers, and recently, as 
discussed above, a structurally ill1conceived 
industrial policy. A long1term vision which 
would take into account the fundamentally 
changed conditions has never existed. The 
government has been implicitly prolonging 
the suffering of sugar refineries by provid1
ing massive support to the industry. On the 
one hand, it would not let enterprises go 
bankrupt; on the other hand, the efficiency 
of the industry has constantly fallen.  
One reason for this may be that the gov1
ernment was willing to support the linger1
ing factories because it did not want to lose 
domestic production of sugar as a strategic 
product. Another may be that it was afraid 
of possible social outbursts. In any case, this 
intervention has always been short1term, 
because nobody seems to have bothered 
with long1term restructuring. A third rea1
son, however, is probably that the govern1
ment has often been the target of lobbying 
by interest groups, such as major sugar 
producers and their associations, who have 
demanded special treatment for the indus1
try. This has also contributed significantly 
to the short1term (and, therefore, destruc1
tive) nature of the interventions, because 
this lobbying has often been individual. 
Therefore, there is a growing need for a 
long1term vision for the Ukrainian sugar 
sector. A sound strategy for the industry 
should be developed, taking into account 
both macroeconomic conditions and in1
dustry1specific problems, as well as political 
and institutional constraints, also including 
the delicate relationship with international 
financial institutions, as indicated above.  
In the following box, we propose a general 
outline for such a policy plan, very much 
inspired by the design of Belgium’s former 
textile restructuring policy. Possible appli1
cation of such a methodology to developing 
a restructuring plan for Ukraine’s sugar 
industry is given after the box. 
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Methodology for developing a sectoral restructuring policy plan 
Application of proper methodology is crucial for developing an effective longterm industry restructuring 
policy plan. The methodology we offer basically consists of the following three elements: 
. Identification of economic problems in the troubled sector; 
. Definition of policy objectives; and 
. Development of policy measures. 
 
. Identification of the economic problems of the troubled sector 
Problemidentification should focus only on the economic issues at this initial phase, in order to get a 
clear idea on the longterm determinants of sustainable solutions. 
The focus on the economic aspects only is the best guarantee to come to sound solution design with a 
perspective on longterm sustainability and health of the sector, with only a reasonable burden for the 
state budget. Social issues and consequences will be plugged in later and are thus not neglected by such 
an approach, on the contrary: by stressing the economic viability of the solutions, the Government is 
laying the proper foundations for the development of decent and sustainable social conditions and well
being. (“You cannot build a social paradise on an economic desert!”). 
Useful problem indicators are: 
• Competitiveness (production costs and production quality internationally compared, efficient links 
into the international markets, etc.); 
• Financial situation (debt/equity ratio, profitability, free cash flow, etc.) 
• Technical and managerial conditions. 
The problemanalysis should be centred around the following fundamental questions: 
• Is there any way a future for the sector can be ensured, based on a fully competitive and open market 
economy, without state intervention? 
• If yes, what are the structural adjustments needed to reach this position? 
• How can the state support the efforts made by the private sector to reach this position? 
In case there is no real future for the sector that makes any economic sense, then the only option is to close 
down this line of economic activity. The government can take several positions to bring this about or to do 
the opposite: 
• Nonintervention while enterprises are going in liquidation or even bankruptcy (which in this case is 
a sound process of economic sanitation of the overall economic structure of the economy); 
• Soft intervention with a scheme for mitigating the social consequences and for promoting labour 
reconversion (this is a reasonable political option in case the sector is very important in the current 
economic structure of the country or is heavily concentrated in a certain region; a good example is 
probably the mining sector); 
• Heavy intervention with a view of maintaining the activity or, so to say, fading it out at a very 
gradual pace. That is what the government, without being explicit on the matter and probably 
without proper consideration and deliberation, is currently doing in the sugar industry. This option 
is extremely costly, most harmful for the economic development of new sectors and hence for the 
renewal of the economy. It will typically prolong economic hardship and social pain, and does not, in 
the end, solve the real problem, i.e. that the sector has no future and will continue to destroy economic 
valueadded. When pursued on a broad base, covering an important percentage of the economic 
activity of the country, it is a good recipe for accelerated impoverishment of the country. 
For all the proposed measures, the economic implications, especially the budget consequences, should be 
well analysed in advance. It is only by doing that, that one can fully assess the viability and economic 
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soundness of the proposed measures, and that one can be in a position to oversee the global package of 
measures and decisions needed to make the policy effective (legislative initiatives, budget decisions, 
implementation resolutions and orders, etc.) 
 
. Definition of the policy objectives 
The policy objectives must be clearly defined and wellcommunicated. They will be concentrated around 
three topics: 
• The industrial or sectoral objectives: structural adjustment needed, ideal industrial organisation 
(competition, minimum efficient scale, domestic valueadded, specialisation, domestic and 
international market channels, etc.); 
• The economic viability of the enterprises: financial redressing of the companies, sound financial 
structure (debt/equity ratio, free cash flow, long term profitability, etc.), healthy cost structure, high 
capital productivity, sound management and good technical base, proper corporate governance and 
effective ownership, strongly developed marketing function, etc.; 
• The social objectives: appropriate employment level, high labour productivity, social accompanying 
measures, etc. 
The compatibility of the objectives should be checked as well as the possibility, especially in terms of burden 
on the budget, to pursue them all at the same time. Hence, it is advisable to define their order of priority: 
(a) this should not be counterproductive for the economic viability of the scheme and from the point of 
view of sound public governance, and (b) often it is best to do this in a discrete way to avoid political 
commotion which may put the fundamental guidelines of the scheme at risk, because of shortsighted 
political claims based on narrow group interests. 
 
. Policy measures: mechanisms and management 
The design of the policy measures is probably the trickiest thing, as to a large extent it will determine the 
effectiveness and the ultimate impact of the scheme. There are five focal points which should be well
considered: 
• the nature of the policy measures and the types of supportive interventions; 
• the allocation of financial resources; 
• the legal base and framework for the policy scheme; 
• the institutional framework for the implementation of the scheme; and 
• the management of the policy scheme. 
Especially the last two are extremely important for a successful implementation, as they deal with the real 
implementation decisions and have to tackle and anticipate the entailed risk for deviation from the set 
objectives, corruption or improper use of resources. 
The nature of the policy measures and the types of supportive interventions 
Typically, the economic and industrial objectives will be attempted by conditional, financial support 
measures and by business, management, and marketing consulting services, while the social objectives 
will be subject of accompanying reconversion and social safety net measures. 
Targets for the conditional, financial support will typically be: 
• new investment projects to structurally improve the standing of the enterprise; 
• broad financial restructuring to redress the debt/equity ratio and the working capital position; and 
• investment in working capital, accompanying an enterprise restructuring scheme, an investment 
project or a new business plan/strategy. 
The most important financial criteria for the conditional, financial support should be: 
• the economic viability of the proposed project and/or strategy; 
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• the right to control the use of the allocated resources during the implementation of the project 
supported by the policy scheme; 
• the temporary nature of the financial support (firm commitments and enforceable obligations to 
return the allocated financial support, proper assessment of the repayment capacity of the enterprise 
for the assumed debt and obligations); 
• effective ownership by the shareholders, sound corporate governance mechanism, effective corporate 
control over the management – all this might possibly entail changing the ownership structure 
(consolidation of shares into larger groups and promoting effective outsider control); and 
• possibly, the involvement of outside investors and complementary commercial bank investment loan. 
Financial instruments that can be used should be clearly defined and very well secured. Possibilities are 
equity participation, interest subsidy, low interest loan, and hybrid financial instruments. 
The service complement of the policy scheme can entail consulting support in defining an enterprise 
restructuring strategy or assessing an investment project, training and advice regarding the 
strengthening of the marketing function, a sectorwide marketing plan to promote the product nationwide 
as well as internationally, etc. 
The allocation of financial resources  
Proper financial resources have to be made available for the implementation of the scheme. Several 
considerations should be given: 
• How much financial resources are necessary to achieve an effective impact in terms of supporting the 
private sector to improve its performance in a sustainable way? 
• How should the resources be made available? From a direct budget allocation or by means of a loan 
from an International Financial Institution? This question is related to the management challenges 
involved in such a policy scheme. It is advised to involve the international financial institutions in 
it to have better guarantees for sound management of the restructuring fund and the policy scheme. 
The legal base and framework for the policy scheme 
The executive body for the policy scheme must have a clear legal mandate, with welldefined 
responsibilities and control mechanisms. All proposed interventions must have an explicit legal base and 
the financial instruments must be legally secured. Normally, a whole set of legislative acts and 
implementation resolutions should be developed and approved. 
The institutional framework for the implementation of the scheme 
The executive body for the implementation of the scheme should be set up on a clearly defined and legally 
based mandate. It is imperative that the decisionmaking is fully and integrally delegated to such a body, 
which should be completely independent of politics and the administration. The better option, in line with 
the suggestion to involve the international financial institutions in the funding, is to have an important 
participation of international experts. Effective control mechanism and responsibilities should be defined 
as to ensure that the decisions made and the approval of investment dossiers is exclusively based on the 
inherent, economic soundness of the proposals. In case the Government also decides to complement the 
financial measures with a package of support services, additional institutional arrangements might be 
necessary. 
The management of the policy scheme 
The rules of the game should be clearly defined in a transparent way and effectively communicated to all 
involved. Transparency is often the best guarantee for objective decisionmaking. Realistically speaking, 
this will probably necessitate the involvement of management consultants at the level of dossier 
preparation and the involvement of international experts in assessing the proposals and the 
implementation capacity of the enterprise and its management. Principles of the modus operandi, which 
have been proven to be very effective are: 
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• selectivity: “back the winners”; 
• projectoriented approach, instead of companyoriented; 
• minimal financial support as to increase the commitment of the shareholders and the management; 
• temporary nature of the support; 
• complementary nature of the financial support; 
• secured controllability. 
It is also important that no adjustments, which are not in line with the original policy scheme, are 
admitted. Ukrainian policymaking has a very rich tradition of ad hoc interventions (e.g. granting 
privileges to specific enterprises) spoiling the originally flawless scheme. For this purpose, independent 
and strong management of the policy plan, increased openness and lack of secrecy in its implementation 
are crucial. 
Possible sketch for Ukraine’s sugar sector 
Applying the approach described in the 
box above would lead to a sound policy out1
line that is effectively tackling the real is1
sues, while also opening some perspectives 
on agreement with and support from the 
international financial institutions and the 
broader donor community. This moral and 
financial support is deemed to be very im1
portant for the success of these major re1
structuring challenges. Especially the rul1
ings regarding institutional arrangements 
and transparency of the policy and its im1
plementation are crucial aspects in sound 
policy design and for convincing the inter1
national community. 
As we concluded earlier, even though the 
industry is technically capable of producing 
this much of sugar, it is (a) loss1making, (b) 
unable to compete with other world’s pro1
ducers, and (c) unable to compete with 
other Ukrainian industries, since opportu1
nity costs in other industries are lower. 
Hence, the questions that should be put on 
the government’s agenda, are as follows: 
. Is the sector worth restructuring? 
. What should be the restructuring poli1
cies? 
                                                                    
 Simply speaking, the land, human and techni1
cal resources used for sugar production in 
Ukraine can be used for alternative purposes, 
which would result in creation of a greater value 
added. 
. How can the government mitigate so1
cial effects and facilitate re1
employment? 
The amount of sugar produced in Ukraine 
roughly equals domestic consumption, but 
the industry is loss1making and the only 
obvious way to improve its efficiency is to 
let the most efficient refineries produce the 
amount of sugar needed. According to 
many estimates, including those by Ukrtsu1
kor,  refineries would suffice for that 
purpose. The production would be much 
more efficient, since (a) the most efficient 
refineries would stay in the sector, (b) their 
capacities would be fully utilised. If the in1
dustry gains momentum in the future and 
is able to produce more sugar on a com1
petitive basis, whether from domestically 
grown beetroot or from imported raw 
sugar, then it can increase production, but 
without any government intervention. In 
political terms, this means that most 
Ukraine’s sugar refineries (some three 
quarters of them) should be shut down. 
                                                                    
 Ukrtsukor is Ukraine’s National Association of 
Sugar Producers. The association was established 
on the basis of the former Sugar Committee, a 
government institution responsible for sugar 
production planning and control. The associa1
tion still performs many functions of that com1
mittee. 
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With this answer to the first question, 
whether it makes sense to restructure the 
sector, the policy objectives as defined ear1
lier should be:  
• to reform the industry so as to achieve 
its efficiency and competitiveness,  
• perform microeconomic restructuring 
(i.e. ensure economic viability of the re1
fineries), and  
• solve resulting social issues.  
The objectives must be clearly defined and 
communicated to the major players in the 
sector. These are the oligopolies, whose 
objective is to maintain and strengthen 
their position in the market, the farmers, 
who are forced to grow beetroot and thus 
prevented from alternative uses of their 
limited resources, and the labour force 
employed in the sector. 
The answers to the second and third ques1
tions, i.e. how the restructuring should be 
performed and how negative social effects 
should be offset, are discussed below. 
Industry restructuring policy 
While developing a restructuring policy, 
economic efficiency, profitability, and 
competitiveness of the sugar industry 
should be recognized as the ultimate eco1
nomic objective. After all actors recognize 
that, any measures preventing the achieve1
ment of this objective should be recognized 
as inappropriate. The government should 
also pay attention to the following issues: 
• Industry restructuring should be fully in 
line with macroeconomic policies of the 
government. The development of the 
industry is dependent not only upon the 
industry1specific policies, but, to a great 
extent, on the macroeconomic policies. 
Thus, for example, favourable invest1
ment and tax policies, as well as small 
and medium enterprise development, 
are crucial. 
• All government policies, both macro1
economic and industry1specific, should 
be predictable because investors and 
market participants are primarily inter1
ested in the stability of terms and condi1
tions rather than specific terms and 
conditions themselves. 
• Restructuring policies must facilitate a 
conversion of the production towards a 
more efficient and cheaper technology 
based on processing raw (cane) sugar. 
This will contribute to the efficiency of 
the economy in two ways: () by allowing 
sugar refineries to achieve better capac1
ity utilisation, () by allowing for alter1
native use of land, human and resources 
by industries where Ukraine has better 
comparative advantages and where op1
portunity costs are lower. 
Since competitiveness is the ultimate objec1
tive, free market policies should be pur1
sued. True market management in the sub1
sector must lead to the following measures: 
• Any government support and interven1
tions should be reduced to a minimum, 
if not fully ceased. The government 
should: () refrain from fuel and input 
supplies to refineries, () stop forcing 
the farmers to grow beetroot. As a re1
sult, only those having access to credit, 
i.e. viable enterprises, will stay in. 
• Market actors should have the freedom 
to produce and sell beetroot and sugar, 
as well as process raw cane sugar. In this 
respect, quotas and minimum prices 
must be lifted. 
• Import policies should be liberalized 
significantly: import duties should be ei1
ther reduced to a minimum. 
• Transport of the beets from one rayon 
to another, as well as between oblasts, 
must be made free. Consequently, there 
will be absolute freedom for a sugar beet 
producer to sell his own crop to the 
sugar refinery of his choice. The same 
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applies to sugar refineries, which will be 
free to purchase the beets for processing 
anywhere. 
• Therefore, no monopolistic position in 
the sugar industry should be tolerated. 
Any other measures obstructing free 
market polices should be rejected. 
• The industry is highly dependent on the 
adjacent factor markets, such as the 
market for land and labour. Land 
should finally become private property 
and the land market should be liberal1
ized. 
• As regards labour, free movement of 
labour should be enabled. Today, many 
administrative barriers prevent this 
(‘propyska’, registration with local poly1
clinics and military commissariats, etc.; 
see below). 
• A market cannot effectively function 
without market infrastructure and insti1
tutions supporting it. Hence, govern1
ment policies should foster the emer1
gence of such a market infrastructure. 
Relevant institutions supporting the 
market and protecting the legal rights of 
its actors should be set up. 
• This industry allows for large farms. 
Growing and selling sugar beet does not 
tolerate improvisation. Farms should 
use appropriate seeds, inputs, and agri1
cultural machinery, as well as minimize 
sugar beet losses during harvesting. For 
that, farmers — more than in many other 
sectors — need strong representative or1
ganization to negotiate with industrial1
ists. 
• Where necessary, and otherwise impos1
sible, the government can provide 
credit to prospectively viable enter1
prises. However, this should be done 
                                                                    
 This matter is beyond the scope of this article; 
it is considered in this issue of Policy Studies by 
Csaba Csaki and Zvi Lerman. 
through commercial banks with banks 
bearing the commercial risks. The banks 
can assess the business/restructuring 
plan and make the decision. 
• In all instances of government pro1
curement, the government should pay 
in cash. This will create competition 
amongst prospective contractors who 
are willing to work for cash payment and 
disable corruption. 
Market strategy of sugar 
producers 
Sugar producers will, naturally, have to re1
consider their market strategies, if the 
above policies are pursued. If no guaran1
teed sales exist, the refineries will have to 
adapt their production to the changing 
environment. When doing so, they will have 
to identify domestic and neighbouring 
markets and consider technological 
changes necessary to achieve their competi1
tiveness. 
In general, there is a good prospective for 
sales in the domestic market, since white 
sugar is difficult to transport and its storage 
is expensive, and therefore it make sense in 
many cases to make it domestically. Ulti1
mate consumers of sugar are not only indi1
viduals, but also food industry (bakery, non1
alcoholic beverages, brewery, spirits, and 
feed milling). A very important consumer is 
confectionery. Ukrainian producers also 
have good chances in Middle and Far East 
markets, such as the former Soviet repub1
lics in Asia. However, this requires that the 
sugar can be sold at competitive prices. 
Obviously, the producers will not be able to 
avoid changes in technology. The two di1
rections, in which the industry will have to 
change, are () development of raw cane 
sugar processing, and () production of 
sugar substitutes. 
Ukrainian refineries are already processing 
cane sugar. This mostly happens when 
market deficit occurs in late June (before 
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the production season in Ukraine begins) 
and the government adopts a special reso1
lution allowing duty1free raw sugar imports. 
This pattern has occurred for at least a few 
consecutive years, and the amount of raw 
sugar necessary to cover the deficit has 
been growing every year. In , it was 
, tons.  
In most cases, the leading actors of the 
Ukrainian sugar market imported raw 
sugar. Others are not strong (or not rich) 
enough to react instantly to the government 
resolutions: This kind of resolutions is con1
sidered as an ad hoc measure and imply 
that raw sugar be imported within a few 
days. Consequently, quotas for such im1
ports are given to those who have their 
ships ready, i.e. the richer or informed 
ones. 
A third of Ukrainian refineries are 
equipped to process raw sugar, while the 
rest of the refineries could enable such 
processing by introducing reasonable tech1
nological changes. However, raw sugar im1
ports are generally too expensive (except 
for imports within the mentioned special 
resolutions). The duty to be paid in case of 
raw sugar imports is % of the customs 
value. These imports should be liberalized 
and, ultimately, raw sugar should enter the 
Ukrainian market duty1free. 
Another supporting argument for raw sugar 
processing is that neighbouring Russia and 
Belarus are already exporting (though, of1
ten illegally) white sugar processed from 
raw sugar to Ukraine’s eastern regions. This 
does not only prove that (since traditional 
producers of beetroot sugar are implement1
ing the new technology) technological 
changes in sugar production should be fi1
nally taken into account. It also means that 
Ukraine can no longer maintain the costly 
beetroot sugar production, and no admin1
istrative measures will help the country do 
that in the long run. 
Another prospective niche for Ukrainian 
sugar refineries is the production of sugar 
substitutes (isoglucose, inulin and high1
fructose maize syrup). They are not tradi1
tional for the Ukrainian market, but al1
ready widely popular in the North America, 
where their consumption roughly equals a 
half of total.  
It may be argued that the average Ukrain1
ian will not immediately adapt to consum1
ing substitutes instead of “real sugar”, but 
industrial consumers of sugar, especially 
the food industry, could easily introduce 
respective changes in their technological 
processes. 
Moreover, if Ukrainian refineries do not 
introduce the production of cheaper sugar 
substitutes today, there’s a serious threat of 
further loosing market share to competi1
tors. Since sugar substitutes do not fall 
within the current quota regulations, they 
will freely enter the Ukrainian market and 
thus indirectly limit the consumption of 
white sugar produced in Ukraine. 
The only option the government will then 
have is to introduce even heavier interven1
tion by setting high tax rates for such im1
ports, introducing quotas for sugar substi1
tutes, or doing both. In other words, the 
very same problem may recur in a not too 
distant future. Ukraine’s sugar industry will 
then remain uncompetitive, loss1making 
and burdening for the government budget. 
The Ukrainian consumers will keep on pay1
ing more. This is another proof that current 
policies, which arguably support the indus1
try in the short run, definitely destroy it in 
the long run and are harmful for the whole 
economy. 
Social issues 
Industrial social conflicts have typically oc1
curred not only as a result of shrinking 
production. They have often also been 
caused by technology growth and improved 
efficiency, which decreased the need for 
labour. In this sense, the social issues are a 
special part of the industrial restructuring 
plan, and deserve special attention. As we 
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mentioned before, the solutions for social 
problems should only be considered after 
economic priorities have been defined; 
otherwise, the seemingly successful short1
term decision may eventually result in ma1
jor disasters. If underlying economic prob1
lems are solved successfully, they can be a 
foundation for building up social welfare, 
not otherwise. 
In management of social conflicts resulting 
from industrial restructuring, the goal is 
generally threefold:  
• to achieve consensus for restructuring;  
• to enhance the social protection of the 
workers involved; and  
• to boost their chances for re1
employment. 
As regards achieving consensus, we think it 
is most important to start an open discus1
sion at every level involved. The question 
will basically boil down to gaining the ac1
ceptance for essential restructuring by 
those involved: (a) associations represent1
ing the industry (such as Ukrtsukor and its 
regional subsidiaries), and (b) the workers 
of sugar refineries. However, as we stressed 
earlier, it is crucial that openness and 
transparency of such a discussion be guar1
anteed. In addition, once consensus has 
been achieved and the decision to restruc1
ture the industry has been made, workers 
should be warned; this will allow them to 
plan their actions long in advance. 
The questions that will have to be taken 
care of thereafter are () social protection 
of released workers, () possibilities of their 
alternative employment, and () re1
adaptation of production in the troubled 
regions. 
In SOCIAL PROTECTION, the following in1
struments, mostly aimed at labour conver1
sion, should be considered and imple1
mented (as long as they fall within the 
agreed budget limits): 
• early retirement (and associated tempo1
rary allowances); 
• tide1over allowances; 
• compensation for loss of income; 
• relocation expenses (to encourage geo1
graphical mobility); 
• compensation payments; and 
• training allowances. 
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT in Ukraine, 
though not only for the sugar refinery 
workers, is contingent on two major factors, 
which actually go beyond the industrial re1
structuring plan: development of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and reducing 
barriers to workforce migration. 
If the government policies promote SME 
development, it will be much easier to alle1
viate the social tension. Analysing this issue 
is beyond the scope of this article. In this 
context we will only mention that sugar re1
finery workers have relatively better 
chances than workforce in Ukraine’s other 
unrestructured sectors (such as steel, coal 
or energy) because their labour skills here 
are relatively less unique, and thus allow for 
more flexible employment. 
Workforce migration should be eased. 
Many administrative barriers currently pre1
vent it: “propyska”, registration with local 
polyclinics and military commissariats. 
Propyska is a local residence permit. Every 
Ukrainian national should have a permit to 
reside in a specific place. The current law 
regards permanent residence in a different 
place, or residence without a permit at all, 
as a serious offence. In addition, without 
having a propyska (or having a propyska in 
a place different than the place of his/her 
actual residence), a citizen or his family 
cannot enjoy many social services such as 
health care, education, etc. Changing pro1
pyska often constitutes a problem because 
the applicant must provide sufficient rea1
sons to substantiate his application. 
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Polyclinic is an institution where the popu1
lation can get medical assistance, in most 
cases for free. If the individual has no pro1
pyska in that area, he/she must pay for all 
services he could otherwise receive for free. 
Besides all that, able1bodied male popula1
tion is registered at local military commis1
sariats and can be convened in case of mili1
tary danger. All this immobilizes signifi1
cantly the labour market. Reform in this 
area should start by abolishing propyska. 
RE)ADAPTATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE 
TROUBLED REGIONS in the case of the sugar 
sector, again, can be handled relatively eas1
ier than in others, since sugar production, 
unlike coal and steel for example, is not 
concentrated in a specific area of the coun1
try. On the contrary, sugar refineries are 
scattered across Ukraine. This, however, 
does not mean that regional problems will 
not occur. Yet, abandoned areas will be 
smaller. Towns, in which sugar refineries 
are located, normally depend on them; 
however, this does not make the whole re1
gion such as oblast dependent on those 
refineries. Thus, workers can find alterna1
tive employment in neighbouring areas 
relatively easier. Exceptions are, probably, 
Vinnytsia, Cherkasy and Sumy oblasts, as 
well as Khmel’nyts’ky oblast and the south 
of Kyiv oblast. 
To solve this problem, proper regional de1
velopment policies should be elaborated. 
Regions should be given more independ1
ence. This, on the one hand, will create 
more freedom for the regions, but, on the 
other hand, will also shift part of the re1
sponsibility for the restructuring to re1
gional governments thus ensuring wider 
involvement. The government should fos1
ter the development of regional develop1
ment associations. Again, SME develop1
ment should receive special attention, since 
this can promote the development of the 
new, market1oriented, structure of those 
regions. 
Such social policies will definitely require 
certain budget spending. However, we are 
sure that this spending will be no more 
than spent today on subsidizing the indus1
try. On the other hand, current policies do 
not in any way solve the problems—they only 
aggravate them and perpetuate the need 
for state support—while sound restructur1
ing policies only require spending at the 
initial phase and will result in industry’s 
efficiency and alleviated budget burden. 
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P.S. — A brief overview of recent 
policy developments 
All the articles in this issue of Policy Studies 
were prepared in the summer of ; 
therefore, most references to data and 
other publications are dated before July 
. Due to the heavy overload of Policy 
Studies in recent months, they could not be 
published earlier. Nevertheless, the argu1
ments, and most forecasts, remain valid. 
Ukrainian government policy in agriculture 
has generally improved over the last half1
year, which has been reflected in the re1
duced input supplies to the sector, orienta1
tion towards private farming, and deregula1
tion of the commodities market. Despite 
the entrenched resistance of interest 
groups to such policy measures (for exam1
ple, in the form of arbitrary restrictions on 
grain trade at the local or oblast level), we 
consider this to be a positive change, which 
will help to revive agriculture in Ukraine 
over the next few years. The outcomes re1
main to be seen, but they will definitely af1
fect the issues raised in this publication. 
In farm restructuring, most of the issues 
discussed here remain unresolved, due to 
contradictory legislation. Part of the prob1
lem is that the Presidential Decree “On 
immediate measures to accelerate reform 
of the agricultural sector of the economy” 
(No. / dated  December ) is in 
conflict with laws adopted both previously 
and subsequently. There has been no cer1
tainty on whether land share certificates 
can be used in lieu of land titles (aka, state 
deeds of the right to land ownership). 
Moreover, recently the Ukrainian Parlia1
ment adopted a law banning the purchase1
and1sale transactions in land certificates 
allowed earlier by the abovementioned de1
cree. 
At the legislative level, this problem could 
be solved through adoption of the Land 
Code, which has so far passed first reading 
in Parliament. In addition, there exists 
little support for the land reform process in 
terms of institutional framework. 
As regards the financial problems of 
Ukrainian agriculture, a legislative solution 
has not yet been agreed upon. The law “On 
mortgage” has not been adopted yet. The 
moratorium on bankruptcy of agricultural 
enterprises is also one of the major handi1
caps preventing effective development of 
the sector, as hard budget constraints and 
strict financial discipline cannot be applied 
to farms. An important positive develop1
ment, however, is that the Parliament re1
cently cancelled the Kartoteka regime, 
which sanctioned the unappealable seizure 
of funds from corporate bank accounts by 
the state. 
Earlier, the Ukrainian government also 
made a number of moves to reduce inter1
                                                                    
 Since this happened in July , the draft 
Land Code is not discussed herein. 
 The draft passed first reading on  October 
. 
 See the Law “On the procedure for redeeming 
taxpayer debts owed to [state] budgets and 
targeted funds”. 
 See Cabinet of Ministers resolutions “On new 
approaches to supplying agricultural producers 
with inputs” ( January ) and “On 
additional measures for crediting spring 
fieldwork in ” ( February ), 
Presidential Decree “On the creation and 
functioning of an agricultural market” ( June 
), etc. 
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vention in the sector and help create mar1
ket relationships in it. However, no real 
market relationships can be expected until 
the land market problem is resolved prop1
erly. One of the consequences is that in1
vestment in Ukrainian agriculture remains 
low. 
The tax problem also remains unsolved, 
largely hampered by the continuing failure 
of the Parliament to adopt the new Tax 
Code. Conflicts of interest prevent stabil1
ity and predictability of tax legislation in 
Ukraine. In particular, the attempt of the 
President to restore collection of the VAT 
from agricultural enterprises has met with 
strong resistance from the Ukrainian Par1
liament, which had introduced a morato1
rium on VAT payment for agricultural en1
terprises. 
A number of solutions to these problems, as 
well as to some of those discussed in the 
article on farm restructuring and land re1
form, is offered in the draft Law “On stimu1
lation of the development of agriculture for 
the period –”, which is being con1
sidered by the Verkhovna Rada. The meas1
ures suggested by the document include 
effective protection of property rights, de1
velopment of a market infrastructure, es1
tablishment of an agricultural credit sys1
tem, etc. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the law will be adopted in its cur1
rent edition. Besides, an institutional 
framework to support these solutions is as 
essential (if not more so) as the law itself, 
but hardly any measures have been taken to 
set up this framework. 
                                                                    
 The Tax Code was adopted in first reading 
back in July . 
 On the other hand, full1scale implementation 
of the measures suggested by the draft would 
create a serious burden on the government 
budget. For a concise overview, see Quarterly 
Predictions #. 
Another continuing problem is the much1
debated % export duty on sunflower 
seeds, which has not been rescinded. It ap1
pears, moreover, that it has not played the 
moderating role it was supposed to play. As 
everyone involved in the debate remem1
bers, one of the most important arguments 
of advocates of the export tax was that it 
would help reduce the area sown under 
sunflowers so that “sound agronomic prac1
tices” could be complied with. Recent de1
velopments show clearly that this is not the 
case. Ukraine’s record crop of sunflower 
seeds in  was due to increased yield, 
while the area under the crop remained at 
precisely the same level as a year ago (. 
million hectares). 
We believe that sunflower exports for 
MY’/ will be comparable to the 
MY’/ levels. Exporters have often re1
sorted to loopholes such as the notorious 
“give1and1take” (in1kind tolling payment) 
scheme to effectively export sunflower 
seeds on a duty1free basis. All this, in turn 
(as microeconomic theory would predict), 
will mean a welfare loss for the economy. In 
addition, the current debate on the sun1
flower export tax in the Verkhovna Rada 
has simply postponed a large part of the 
exports, not restrained them. 
Finally, the sugar problem in Ukraine has 
perhaps remained as acute as it was. Beet1
root production declined further, by over 
% in  compared to . This will 
lead to a decline in the production of beet1
root sugar. Exports have declined, and im1
ports of both raw and white sugar have in1
creased (white sugar imports increased 
about tenfold against ); the same de1
velopments are expected in . As ac1
knowledged by all sugar specialists, the re1
cent regulations related to sugar produc1
tion and sales, including Cabinet of Minis1
ters Resolution No.  “On certain issues 
of the state regulation of sugar production 
and sales” (dated  June ), which are 
criticised in this issue, have not worked. 
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In addition, as is forecasted herein, 
Ukraine has been facing the competition of 
its neighbours, Russia and Belarus, whose 
markets it was supposedly going to conquer 
with its beetroot sugar. The issue of illegal 
trafficking remains unresolved. As we had 
predicted, more control in related areas has 
been imposed (e.g., stricter controls over 
sugar imports and pricing, minimum prices 
for beetroot, on1site “tax posts” of the State 
Tax Administration at enterprises, etc.). 
Once again, the Parliament was forced to 
reschedule the debts of sugar refineries 
until , but it has not bothered to ad1
dress the real causes of the problem. Thus, 
the criticisms regarding the lack of com1
petitiveness of Ukraine’s sugar industry 
have become still more relevant. And, 
therefore, the structural approach sug1
gested herein is more topical than ever. 
An important change compared to all pre1
vious seasons is that  sugar refineries out 
of  did not operate this year, which is a 
logical agony rather than the result of a 
sound restructuring policy. It is thus essen1
tial that the Ukrainian government should 
realise this and refrain from further “per1
fecting” the sugar legislation, as currently 
suggested by advocates of the quota system. 
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